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ABSTRACT 
Although the Canada-United States (US) defence relationship is unparalleled in the 
international system in terms of cooperation and interoperability, Canada’s responses to offers of 
participation in two US missile defence programs in recent times confused many observers. This 
thesis seeks to provide an explanation as to why Canadians were reluctant to engage in the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1985 and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 
program in 2005. It searches for a deeper explanation than offered thus far by scholars. Phillipe 
Lagassé and Patrick Lennox have both argued that the most prominent factor in Canada’s 
rejection of these two US missile defence initiatives is the evident support Canadians exhibit for 
arms control and strategic stability. The thesis builds on the work of Lagassé and Lennox but 
goes further by suggesting that Canadian anxieties related to how these programs would impact 
arms control and strategic stability can be traced to Canadians’ support of internationalism and, 
in particular, the tenet of internationalism that, according to Kim Richard Nossal, Stephane 
Roussel and Stephane Paquin, emphasizes the pursuit of world order.
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ABM – Anti-ballistic Missile 
GMD – Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
 “Canada's highest foreign policy priority” is, as David Leyton Brown noted, “the 
management of its relations with the United States.”1 North American defence, a key feature of 
this relationship, is the focus of this thesis. More specifically, the thesis seeks to provide an 
explanation as to why Canadians have been reluctant to engage in ballistic missile defence 
programs developed by the US. It examines two recent cases where the Canadian government 
decided against participating in US missile defence programs—the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI) in 1985 and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program in 2005. 
SDI was a research proposal unveiled by US President Ronald Reagan in 1983. Although 
a research project rather than a definitive weapons system, SDI sought to render nuclear weapons 
obsolete through a multi-faceted defence system.
2
 A centerpiece of Reagan's Cold War agenda, 
the program received billions of dollars in funding throughout his presidency, while eliciting 
much skepticism and opposition from the US public and abroad. Although often credited with 
contributing to the fall of the Soviet Union, SDI was eventually phased out during the presidency 
of George H. W. Bush after years of limited technical success in producing a realistic plan for a 
weapons system. 
The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program was introduced by President 
George W. Bush in 2002. Unlike SDI, GMD became a functional defence system, limited in 
scope, but nonetheless capable of defending North America against nuclear attacks from 
                                                     
1
 David Leyton Brown, “Managing Canada-United States Relations in the Context of Multilateral Alliances,” in 
America's Alliances and Canadian-American Relations, ed. Lauren McKinsey and Kim Richard Nossal (Toronto: 
Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1988), 162. 
2
 Robert Kromer, New Weapons and NATO: Solutions or Irritants (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 153. 
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accidental launches by a major power or small-scale launches from rogue states.
3
 Over the next 
several years following the announcement of the program, missile defence systems were 
established in Alaska and continental US, in spite of questions concerning the feasibility of the 
technology.
4
 As with SDI, there was no request from the US Administration for Canadian bases, 
personnel or financial support. Washington was simply looking for political support for these 
projects. In the end, it found an ally whose population was ardently opposed to Canadian 
participation in any such endeavor.  
 
1.2 Orienting the Debate 
The central question that the thesis will address is: what is it about missile defence that 
has brought Canadians and their governments to reject it out of hand, or rather to choose not to 
participate in US-missile defence initiatives? D. W. Middlemiss and J. J. Sokolsky have 
suggested that any issue related to nuclear weapons is a major problem for Canadians.
5
 Other 
authors maintain that both of these missile defence initiatives raise discomforting issues related 
to Canadian sovereignty. Brian Bow is one of many analysts who have argued that the 
governments of Brian Mulroney and Paul Martin made their respective decisions to forgo 
participation in SDI and GMD on the basis of domestic political considerations; that is, in both 
cases, for the government of the day, missile defence was too explosive an issue, given the 
unsettled nature of the domestic political environment.
6
  Douglas A. Ross has said that in taking 
such decisions, Canadians demonstrated that they have a different view of military strategy and 
                                                     
3
 Steven Kendall Holloway, Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest (Toronto: Broadview Press, 
2006), 63. 
4
 Ibid., 63-65. 
5
 D. W. Middlemiss and J. J. Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants (Toronto: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1989), 120. 
6
 Brian Bow, “Defence Dilemmas: Continental Defence Cooperation, From Bomarc to BMD,” Canadian Foreign 
Policy vol. 15 no. 1(2009), . 
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of continental defence.
7
 Finally, there is the view espoused by Phillipe Lagassé
8
 and Patrick 
Lennox
9
 that Canada’s response to missile defence is most often related to Canadian concerns 
about arms control and strategic stability. 
While all of these explanations are well-founded, this thesis seeks to provide a deeper 
explanation of the decisions on SDI and GMD by looking at the ideas which dominated each 
decision to forgo participation. It builds on the work of Lagassé and Lennox but goes further by 
suggesting that Canada’s decisions against participation related to Canadians’ support of 
internationalism. It demonstrates how Canadians were showing their support for one of 
internationalism’s chief pillars—the pursuit of order. In particular, the commitment to arms 
control and strategic stability supported order through an adherence to international treaties and 
multilateralism. 
The commitment to arms control
10
 has been a lasting feature of Canadian foreign policy 
since the decades after the Second World War. The Permanent Mission of Canada to the United 
Nations notes: “Canada has long pursued non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 
measures aimed at promoting security and reducing the threats faced by Canadians and the 
international community.”11 Evidence of this include Canada’s long-standing positions against 
nuclear weapons, its membership on the International Atomic Energy Commission and sub-
committee of the Disarmament Commission, not to mention its more recent leadership in 
                                                     
7
 Douglas A. Ross, “SDI and Canadian-American Relations: Managing Strategic Doctrinal Incompatibilities,” in 
America’s Alliances and Canadian-American Relations, ed. Lauren McKinsey and Kim Richard Nossal (Toronto: 
Summerhill Press, 1988), 141. 
8Phillipe Lagassé,, “Canada, strategic defence, and strategic stability,” International Journal vol. 63 iss. 4 (2008),. 
9
 Patrick Lennox, At Home and Abroad: The Canada-US Relationship and Canada’s Place in the World 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009).  
10
 A traditional view of arms control and disarmament holds that disarmament includes the total abolition or 
reduction of the resources of war, whereas arms control refers to restraints imposed upon the use of particular 
weapons. John Baylis and Mark Smith, Strategy in the Contemporary World, ed. John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and 
Colin S. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 229. 
11
 “Non-Proliferation, Arms Control And Disarmament,” Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, 
accessed March 19, 2010, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/prmny-mponu/canada_un-canada_onu/positions-
orientations/peace-paix/disarmament-desarmement.aspx?lang=eng. 
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promulgating the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel land mines. According to Michael 
Tucker, this dedication has not always been strongly articulated in policy; rather, governments in 
Ottawa have been alternatively “activist” and “conservative” in their approach to disarmament 
and arms control.
12
 Either way, the commitment to both has endured throughout the Cold War 
and into the twenty-first century.
13
  
Intimately related to arms control is the concept of “strategic stability,” which denotes a 
political and military balance in the international system. Canada was a strong supporter of 
strategic stability in the post-Second World War world by virtue of its active role in the founding 
of the United Nations and its agencies and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
along with its involvement in peacekeeping and international diplomacy. This thesis will show 
that the roots of Canadian support for arms control and strategic stability, like Canadian support 
for peacekeeping, can be found in Canadian political culture—specifically, in the idea embraced 
by Canadians that there is a significant role for Canada to play in preventing conflict and 
maintaining order.  
 
1.3 Internationalism  
Canada’s dedication to arms control and the maintenance of strategic stability is a viable 
explanation for Canadian opposition to the SDI and GMD because of the perception that these 
systems would lead to the weaponization of outer-space, another tumultuous arms race among 
great powers, and/or the destabilization of the international system. Canadians were showing 
                                                     
12
 Tucker contends that the “activist trend” included actively seeking arms control agreements in a multilateral 
setting, and “anti-nuclear idealism” at home. He depicts the “conservative trend”, on the other hand, as an approach 
that “mirrored the ‘reality’ of international politics”, acknowledging deterrence, and NATO’s requirement for 
flexible response. Rather than actively pursuing arms control agreements, the conservative brand witnessed Canada 
welcome agreements submitted by its major allies—the ABM Treaty being a notable example. Michael Tucker, 
“Canada and arms control: perspectives and trends,” International Journal vol. 26 no. 3 (1981): (637-638).  
13
 Ibid., 635-636,  
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their support for the 1967 Outer Space Treaty—banning nuclear weapons in outer space—and 
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence, which limited the US and Soviet Union’s missile 
defence infrastructure to two sites each. Such an argument has been made before by Bow and 
Lennox. However, these authors fail to connect these concerns of Canadians with ideas or beliefs 
that Canadians hold and articulate about Canada’s role or position in the world. This thesis 
maintains that anxieties about how both missile programs would affect arms control and strategic 
stability arise out of what Kim Richard Nossal has called the “dominant idea” of internationalism 
and particularly its tenet that the goal of international action by states should be the 
establishment and maintenance of world order.
14
    
Internationalism
15
 was most notably championed by the late scholar, John Holmes, who 
consciously avoided a precise definition. The term has been subject to a wide range of definitions 
in the Canadian context. Costas Melakopides simply defined internationalism as “pragmatic 
idealism,”16 stating that it includes peacekeeping, arms control, foreign aid, human rights, and 
global ecological concerns. Dave Dewitt and John Kirton characterized internationalism as a 
policy rather than a set of attitudes but assert similarly that it encompasses “functionalism”, 
“mediatory middlepowermanship” and “distributive internationalism.”17 Most recently, Nossal, 
Stephane Roussel and Stephane Paquin offered a more elaborate definition by asserting that 
internationalism is composed of five elements: (i) responsibility in the management of global 
conflicts; (ii)  participation in international institutions; (iii) respect for and reinforcement of 
                                                     
14
 Kim Richard Nossal, Stephane Roussel and Stephane Paquin, International Policy and Politics in Canada 
(Toronto: Pearson Canada, 2010), 135. 
15
 It is important to note that in the Canadian context internationalism is distinct from liberal internationalism. As 
Kim Richard Nossal clarifies, internationalism is unique to Canadians because it is grounded in Canadian political 
culture and history.  Furthermore, as a dominant idea, it is narrower in scope than an ideology, yet still carries 
normative force for foreign policy decisions. Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy 
(Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997), 139, 
16
 Costas Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1995 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1998), 1. 
17
 Don Munton and Tom Keating, “Internationalism and the Canadian Public,” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science vol. 34 no. 3 (2001): 527. 
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international law; (iv) pursuit of the “larger interests of establishing and maintaining order within 
the community of states”; and (v) a willingness to enter into formal commitments to use national 
resources to sustain a stable and peaceful international system.
18
  In all of these definitions we 
may discern two main goals of an internationalist foreign policy –– the pursuit of peace and of 
order –– which, as Don Munton and Tom Keating have said, reflect not only a strategic 
perspective but an ethical one as well: that is to say, the “underlying” goal is the realization of a 
“common good”, or of “what is good for international society in general.”19  
There is little question that Canadian foreign policy has focused on the pursuit of peace 
and order in the international system. Two global wars demonstrated to Canadians the horrors of 
armed conflict, creating both a moral and rational imperative to pursue peace in the world.
20
 
Beyond this, there is the rational and strategic consideration that peace between states is 
indivisible and perhaps even impossible in an anarchic world order devoid of institutions and 
mechanisms for solving international problems. This thesis will argue that the chief aims of 
Canada’s opposition to missile defence stemmed from the component of internationalism that 
seeks to promote or sustain world order through the pursuit of arms control and strategic 
stability.
21
  
 
 
  
                                                     
18
 Nossal, Roussel, and Paquin, 136. 
19
 Munton and Keating, 527. 
20
 Nossal, Roussel and Paquin, 136. 
21
 While the general thrust of this thesis follows from the conception that ideas can determine policy outcomes, it 
also relies on the work of Denis Stairs, who argued that public opinion can define the limits of government action in 
foreign policy; see Denis Stairs, “Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on the Domestication of 
Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal, vol. 33 (1977-1978). Alternative approaches might include 
Organizational Theories like the bureaucratic politics model (Graham T. Allison), or Neorealism (Kenneth N. 
Waltz), although neither would adequately explain Canada’s decisions to not participate in missile defence. 
7 
 
1.4 Methodology  
 The methodology utilized in the thesis reflects an empirical approach to the research, in 
addition to drawing upon normative literature. The thesis uses primary and secondary sources to 
describe and explain Canadian policy towards missile defence; no attempt is made to explore 
what Canada ought to do or have done about participating in such initiatives. Among the most 
important sources were: James G. Fergusson’s Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence 1954-2009: 
Déjà Vu All Over Again, and Patrick Lennox’s chapter titled “Missile Defence, 1983-2009” in At 
Home and Abroad: The Canada-US Relationship and Canada’s Place in the World. The most 
informative primary sources include a variety of government documents and published speeches 
as well as the Debates of the House of Commons. The thesis also cites the memoirs of Prime 
Ministers Brian Mulroney and Paul Martin.  
 The thesis treats SDI and BMD as individual case studies. This approach is used because, 
as Don Munton and John Kirton suggest, it “provides the specificity and detail, about both key 
actions and their antecedents, that are necessary if students are to connect causes to effects, 
assess competing explanations, and begin the task of evaluating or constructing more general 
theories of foreign policy behaviour.”22 Denis Stairs adds that case studies have the ability to 
provide lessons that can be applied to other cases.
23
 Each case study briefly introduces the US 
programs and presents the Canadian appraisal of, and response to, the particular missile defence 
project. In doing so, the thesis examines the role of the public, political parties, bureaucracy, and 
the prime minister. Together the case studies enable us to understand the issues involved and 
demonstrate how arms control and strategic stability were chief factors in each decision. The 
                                                     
22
 Don Munton and John Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada 
Inc., 1992), vi. 
23
 Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1974), 298. 
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fourth chapter confirms the importance of these factors, while explaining how the origins of 
support for arms control and strategic stability are found in Canadian internationalism. The fifth 
and final chapter draws the thesis to a close, illustrating the most important findings and 
considering some questions worth investigating in future research.  
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Chapter 2 
Canada and the Strategic Defense Initiative 
2.1 Introduction 
The US and the Soviet Union “set the terms of the Cold War between east and west” 
through their dominance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw 
Pact respectively.
24
 Canada was not an impartial player during this ideological standoff, having 
been a founding member of NATO in 1949 and entrenching itself in a continental air defence 
arrangement with the United States under the auspices of the North American Air Defence 
Command (NORAD) in 1958. Canada’s Cold War disposition became even more apparent after 
Brian Mulroney and the Progressive Conservatives won a landslide election victory in 1984. 
Like his conservative counterparts abroad, Mulroney was known for his vitriolic criticism of the 
Soviet Union, removing any doubt of Canada’s firm commitment to NATO and liberal-
democracy.
25
 Nonetheless, there were strategic thrusts adopted by Canada’s principal allies 
during the 1980s that, generally speaking, worried or bewildered Canadians. The most notable 
example was Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. This chapter briefly describes the origins of 
this program and then examines the Canadian opposition to it at the public, party, bureaucratic 
and prime ministerial levels, highlighting the significance of the expressed commitment by the 
Canadian government to arms control and strategic stability. 
  
                                                     
24
 Lauren McKinsey and Kim Richard Nossal, America's Alliances and Canadian-American Relations, (Toronto: 
Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1988), 13. 
25
 Stephen Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge: Crisis and Adjustment, 1981-1985 (Toronto: James 
Lorimer & Company, 1985), 357. 
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2.2 Towards the SDI Initiative 
SDI was not conjured in a political or strategic vacuum. As Gary L. Guertner and Donald 
M. Snow note, the hallmark of the Cold War nuclear age was the dominance of offensive over 
defensive weapons.
26
 Patrick Lennox observes further that “the introduction of nuclear weapons 
and ballistic missiles into the international security environment instantly rendered strategic 
defences impotent.”27 In such an environment, the defence and security doctrines that emerged 
were based on deterrence. Nuclear deterrence was premised upon the theory that large quantities 
of nuclear weapons rendered any sort of nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the US, 
including a preemptive strike, too costly for both sides; the policy was colloquially known as 
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).
28
  
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought a swift end to détente,
29
 or what had 
been the relaxation of tensions between the US and USSR and generally characterized the 
superpower relationship throughout the 1970s. This was accompanied by a growing concern in 
the US about the increasing vulnerability of the homeland to ICBMs, not only because the USSR 
had reached numerical parity with the US in nuclear weapons, but also because it was producing 
qualitatively superior weapons.
30
 
While Canadian governments supported the maintenance of nuclear deterrence and 
MAD, Reagan, like his predecessors, did not place great faith in deterrence as the dominant 
strategy to ensure American security.
31
 Reagan’s Manichean world view and belief that the US 
should only negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of strength, coupled with 
                                                     
26
 Gary L. Guertner and Donald M. Snow, The Last Frontier: An Analysis of the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(Toronto: Lexington Books, 1986), 4.  
27
 Lennox, 74. 
28
 According to Patrick Lennox, deterrence doctrines adopted by the US included Massive Retaliation (1954) , 
Graduated Deterrence (1959) and Mutually Assured Destruction (1964), (74). 
29
 Lennox, 75. 
30
 J.S. Finan, “Arms Control and the Central Strategic Balance: Some Technological Issues,” International Journal 
no. 3 (1981): 435.. 
31
 Lennox, 74. 
11 
 
deteriorating relations between the two powers, led his administration to increase defence 
spending by more than any previous administration during peace-time.
32
 This rise in defence 
spending, combined with Reagan’s virulently anti-communist and anti-nuclear rhetoric,33 
rendered his pursuit of missile defence an unsurprising scenario for most attentive observers. Yet 
on 23 March 1983, Reagan surprised the world when he asked, in what has been dubbed the 
“Star Wars” speech:  
What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon 
the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and 
destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?… 
I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to 
turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means 
of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.
34
  
 
 On 7 March 1985, the program was officially launched, becoming an important and 
intensely debated global issue. After speaking to Congress about building a large-scale defensive 
system based on land and sea, and in the sky and outer space, Reagan was granted his request for 
$26 billion in funding over the next five years. As originally conceived, SDI would include 
exotic technology, featuring directed and kinetic energy weapons, and would have the capability 
to perform functions like missile interception and destruction, battle management, 
communications and data processing, as well as various types of surveillance and tracking.
35
 In 
the long run, the program proposed to place such defensive arsenals on land, on sea, and in 
space. It is important to clarify that SDI was not a definitive weapons system, but a research 
proposal meant “to encourage the exploration of a variety of emerging technologies to determine 
their feasibility and suitability as components of a complex system of defense of the American 
                                                     
32
 Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, “The Origins and Meaning of Reagan’s Cold War,” in The Reagan Presidency: 
Assessing the Man and His Legacy,” ed. Paul Kengor and Peter Schweizer (Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2005), 58-59. 
33
 Ibid., 60. 
34
 Guertner and Snow, 151-152. 
35
 James F. Lee, The Strategic Defence Initiative (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 1990), 4-7. 
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homeland against ballistic missiles.”36 Nonetheless, given the thrust of Reagan’s foreign policy 
during his first term in office, many foreign and domestic commentators believed—if the 
research produced results that could translate into a feasible system—such a system would be 
pursued.
37
 Even more alarming for many observers, as Elinor Sloan succinctly states, was that 
Reagan’s proposal “was in effect, turning the offence/defence debate on its head, arguing that the 
best way to guarantee North American security was not offensively, through mutual assured 
destruction, but defensively, through ballistic missile defences.”38 
  The principal justification for SDI was that it constituted a hedge against a Soviet 
unilateral missile defence program: the Reagan Administration maintained that SDI would 
actually strengthen deterrence.
39
 Although most US strategists were less enthusiastic than 
Reagan, many liked the program’s potential to diminish the vulnerability of ICBM sites to a 
Soviet first strike. Just as important, if not more so, SDI created an opportunity to replace the 
discomforting notion of MAD with a more positive “Mutually Assured Survival.”40 There was 
also the prospect of massive investment in scientific infrastructure, thus stimulating both 
economic and strategic pay-offs for the US scientific-military-industrial complex.
41
 
 At the Mulroney-Reagan “Shamrock Summit” held in mid-March 1985, Reagan 
                                                     
36
 Kromer, 152 
37
 As Frances FitzGerald points out “[w]ithin its first two years in office, the administration raised the fear of war in 
Moscow and in the West, fell out with its NATO allies and many of its supporters in Congress and engendered a 
major, broad-based anti-nuclear movement in Europe and the United States,” which was present in Canada as well, 
Frances FitzGerald, Way Out there in the blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 2000), 148. 
38
 Elinor Sloan, Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era: Canada and North America (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2005), 101. 
39
 Canada, The Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations, Interim Report Pertaining to Bilateral 
Trade with the United States and Canada’s Participation in Research on the Strategic Defence Initiative (Ottawa: 
Library of Parliament, 1985), 18:43, 18:46. 
40
 Ibid., 18:43. 
41
 Ross, 143. 
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delivered a plea for Canadian participation in SDI.
42
 Shortly afterward, Washington extended an 
official invitation to all NATO allies to join the new US research initiative.
43
 The Reagan 
administration was not asking its allies for territory, financial resources, or materials. Rather, it 
requested political support in an attempt to increase the international and domestic legitimacy of 
the program.
44
  
In the end, after months of deliberation and intense public debate, the Canadian 
government announced that it would not be participating directly in the SDI program. It will be 
shown here that the decision on SDI was influenced by a broad consensus among Canada’s 
political leaders and political parties, senior bureaucrats, and the public more generally that the 
initiative had the potential to threaten strategic stability and was inconsistent with Canada’s 
historic support of arms control.  
 
2.3 The Public 
 The Strategic Defense Initiative proved to be a highly contentious issue for the Canadian 
public. A Globe Crop poll conducted in early August of 1985 revealed that 57 percent of 
Canadians thought Canada should participate in SDI and another 8 percent if more jobs would be 
garnered for Canada. However, the poll reflected an electorate that was seriously divided over 
the proposal. Fifty-one percent of women opposed participation while support in Quebec, 
Ontario, and the West was only at 52, 58, and 56 percent respectively.
45
 Additionally, a Decima 
                                                     
42
 J. J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel, “Canada and the Future of Strategic Defense,” in Perspectives on Strategic 
Defense, ed. Steven W. Guerrier and Wayne C. Thompson (London: Westview Press, 1987), 188. 
43
 Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament, 1945-1988 (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s, 1992), 411. 
44
 Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal, “Out of the Blue: The Mulroney Legacy in Foreign Policy,” in 
Transforming the Nation: Canada and Brian Mulroney, ed. Raymond B. Blake (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2007), 121. 
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poll conducted in the same month revealed “no great enthusiasm” for participation, “in large part 
because of fears related to a renewed arms race.”46 
Later in August, other polls showed increasing opposition to participation. In fact, a poll 
published by Southam News found that only 40.5 percent of those polled wanted Canada to 
support the program, while 42.3 percent favored rejection.
47
 Regardless of which poll most 
accurately reflected the electorate, it was obvious to most observers that opponents of the SDI 
were far more vocal and formidable than its proponents.
48
 Thus the political costs of supporting 
SDI appeared to outweigh the cost of outright rejection, particularly for the Progressive 
Conservative government, whose political support was based on an uneasy coalition grafted 
between Western Canada and Quebec.  
 
2.3.1 The Peace Movement 
The strongest opposition to Canada’s involvement in the program was found among the 
peace movement. The Canadian peace movement had a lengthy history and had been directly 
involved in the recent efforts to prevent US cruise missile tests over Canada. It was thus already 
effectively organized to take a stand against SDI.
49
 According to Lennox, leading up to the 
Shamrock Summit, “the peace movement in Canada had taken up the SDI issue with 
considerable enthusiasm.”50 During the summer of 1985, peace groups—primarily composed of 
church leaders, civic and international organizations, trade unions, as well as other professional 
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groups
51—worked hard to bring to light public opposition to the program. Approximately five 
hundred groups, which William A. B. Campbell and Richard K. Melchin describe as “well 
financed, selective in their objectives and unified,” wrote and distributed numerous articles and 
briefs and organized several rallies and protests in opposition to the proposal.
52
  
Criticisms provided by the peace movement highlighted the role of the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile and Outer Space Treaties in their hostility towards participation. Canada’s Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) website acknowledged that these peace 
activists “were vocal in their opposition,” fearing the program was inconsistent with US treaty 
obligations pertaining to arms control and would potentially spawn a new arms race.
53
 For 
instance, the distinguished Canadian Group of 78 warned that “Star Wars is a crash program 
designed to achieve a decisive edge over the Soviet Union” in space-based military technology 
and threatened to produce another dangerous arms race.
54
 Others denigrated the SDI as a 
program that would undermine, or already had undermined, the ABM Treaty. 
Opposition to SDI was found among academics as well. Respected scientists like David 
Suzuki fervently condemned it, while numerous defence and strategic thinkers cautioned against 
the program’s potentially destabilizing effects. At a conference in Ottawa in April 1985 
exploring Canadian participation in SDI, several experts spoke of the strategic, international, and 
domestic implications of Star Wars. Charles-Philippe David, for example, warned of the 
potential for a new arms race in both offensive and defensive technologies, which would likely 
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extend to space. He also contended that, as envisaged by the Reagan Administration, SDI would 
diminish both MAD and deterrence and actually increase the probability of a nuclear war.
55
  
 
2.3.2 The Special Joint Committee  
Perhaps the fullest indication of the electorate’s distaste for SDI is found in reports and 
documents of Parliament’s Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations. This 
all-party committee was tasked to study the possibility of Canadian involvement in SDI and a 
free trade agreement with the US. Touring seven cities during five weeks in the summer of 
1985,
56
 the committee received approximately 700 briefs, as well as viewpoints from 120 invited 
witnesses and 200 Canadians who volunteered to participate.
57
  
The so-called experts were overwhelmingly opposed to SDI.
58
 A sizeable majority of 
voluntary participants representing either themselves or organizations were also against 
participation.
59
 The experts and voluntary participants argued that the SDI constituted a threat to 
arms control agreements and the Geneva arms control talks; was not feasible technologically; 
was detrimental to NATO cohesion; and promoted militarism and the military-industrial 
complex. Finally, it was also said that joining the program would diminish Canada’s 
international influence and have a negative effect on Canada’s trade position.60 
Because the Special Joint Committee believed that it did not possess all the relevant 
information needed to make a strong recommendation, on August 23, it urged “the government 
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not take a final decision on participation in the research phase of the SDI until it has been able to 
acquire the required additional information related to the strategic, financial and economic 
implications of the invitation.”61 The committee argued that the context of the decision was 
enmeshed in defence and economic or technological considerations, along with Canada’s 
commitment to arms control, which had been a major issue for numerous participants. It also 
stated flatly: “the majority of the Committee is concerned about the implications of ballistic 
missile defence on international stability and on the future of Canada’s involvement in the arms 
control process.”62  
The committee avoided any denunciation of SDI as a threat to arms control treaties and 
negotiations. Yet it did highlight some of the questions the program posed to the ABM and Outer 
Space Treaties and claimed “the deployment of space-based or ground-based ballistic missile 
defences would require the abrogation, or substantial amendment, of the 1972 ABM Treaty.”63 It 
also cited the view held by many Canadians that the program was a new phase in the arms race, 
in addition to posing a threat to existing arms control agreements and negotiations. Specifically, 
it listed a possible breach of the ABM Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, SALT II, and the 1963 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
64
 and was hindering the Geneva talks on nuclear arms control. 
Moreover, the committee was concerned that participation in the program would render Canada 
“an accomplice in flouting international law.”65  
Clearly there was a general concern about the impact of SDI on Canada’s commitment to 
arms control and its broader effect on strategic stability. Arms control proved to be an issue even 
among Canadians who favored SDI. For example, in an August 1985 newspaper column, 
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Gordon Gibson argued that SDI might be a positive initiative “…especially if it convinces the 
Soviets that a balanced arms reduction might be a better deal for them.”66 This line of thinking 
was attached to support for the US-USSR Geneva talks, which took place later that year. Others 
argued that SDI might enhance deterrence or even lead to the abolition of nuclear weapons, as 
Reagan had envisioned. 
Canadians’ nervousness about the program was not simply a response to a single, albeit 
important, US policy initiative. SDI symbolized a shift in US military strategy with which many 
Canadians were uncomfortable. The growing concern in the US revolving around the perceived 
vulnerability of North America to Soviet ICBMs was largely absent in Canada. In fact, by the 
1980s, Canadians were not nearly as preoccupied with the USSR as was their superpower ally, 
and they were skeptical of some of the US defence policies and plans. The crux of Canadian 
concern, as Stephen Clarkson and James Lorimer pointed out in 1985, centred on “[t]he 
cumulative trend of Pentagon thinking that Reagan has brought to a head is the abandonment of 
the doctrine of mutual deterrence in favour of a counterforce policy envisaging the option of 
limited nuclear war…. U.S. strategy has, in effect, shifted from defence to offence.”67 
There was a growing concern that Canada’s security and defence policy would be 
indirectly affected by the new strategy embraced by the US. Moreover, there was an increasing 
number of Canadians who expressed a concern about the possibility of nuclear war.
68
 Although 
Reagan presented SDI as a means of ending the threat—or even existence—of nuclear weapons 
and, thus, nuclear war, because it was accompanied by a great deal of “evil-empire” rhetoric, 
Canadians understood it to be a plan for an offensive-weapons system.
69
 Canadians were also 
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alarmed at the prospect of future missile defence sites located on Canadian territory, which made 
sovereignty a major issue. Finally, informed observers were skeptical of the technical feasibility 
of the proposal and it was “derided as both fantastically impractical or astronomically 
expensive.”70  
 
2.3.3 The Senate 
The Senate also appeared apprehensive about Canada committing to SDI. Released on 23 
January 1985, the Senate Committee on National Defence’s report, Canada’s Territorial Air 
Defence, addressed missile defence in what Ron Purver has referred to as a “little-noticed section 
on arms control.” The report cautioned that the deployment of ballistic missile defences would 
be extremely costly, negate the ABM Treaty—which it described as “one of the key 
achievements of the post-war arms control process”—and  “run counter to the spirit of current 
arms control accords concerning outer space and might well destroy any hope of establishing 
new accords banning space weaponry.” Canada, it recommended, should avoid joining the US in 
its pursuit of a military space program and limit its activities to surveillance and passive 
detection.
71
 Although the Senate does not garner nearly as much attention as the House of 
Commons largely because of questions concerning its democratic legitimacy and efficacy, the 
Senate Committee’s report at least provides further evidence of the principles that were guiding 
politicians and the wider public. 
 
  
                                                     
70
 Bow, page unnumbered. 
71
 Ronald G. Purver, “Ballistic Missile Defence and Canada,” in Canadian Perspectives on the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (Toronto: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985), 13. 
20 
 
2.4 Political Parties 
 SDI was just about as attractive to Canada’s political parties as it was to the public. 
Douglas Ross succinctly described the concerns in Ottawa at the time: 
Since SDI’s formal inception in March 1983, the leaders of all Canada’s political parties 
have found the United States commitment to 'Star Wars' to be singularly disturbing. What 
they had hitherto thought was a fairly stable and predictable set of policy axioms governing 
the Soviet-American strategic relationship-a set of axioms built on the edifice of mutual 
deterrence, arms control and detente that had been erected in the mid-1970s-suddenly 
seemed to be on the verge of pre-emptive unilateral destruction by neo-conservative zealots 
who had been slotted into the key posts of the international security policy-making 
machinery in Washington.
72
 
Since Canada is a well-functioning democracy, it is hardly surprising that its political parties 
were in tune with the public mood. The Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) and New Democratic 
Party (NDP) articulated clear positions in opposition to SDI from the outset, which reflected the 
opposition among the majority of their supporters. Meanwhile, Mulroney’s refusal to make a 
quick decision on the program and the Senate Committee’s cautiousness spelled uncertainty. The 
party leaders in Canada evidently had a different perspective on missile defence than their 
counterparts in the US. Ross has observed that:   
While Reagan’s Washington thrilled to the spectacle of the upward thrust to the ‘high 
frontier’ and the new ‘high ground’ of space, the Ottawa of Trudeau, Turner and Mulroney 
looked eagerly for a new round of arms control and reciprocal restraint by the 
superpowers.
73
 
 
A closer examination of the positions of the respective opposition parties regarding the program, 
as well as the currents running through the governing Progressive Conservative Party, provides 
further evidence that there was minimal support for participation in SDI because of concerns tied 
to arms control and strategic stability. 
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2.4.1 The Liberal Party  
 The LPC’s denunciation of SDI was expected, given the party’s traditional position on 
missile defence. As early as 1966, Liberal Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson had expressed his 
disapproval of missile defence, describing such an endeavor as a “significant new step in the 
arms race” leading “to ever-mounting defence budgets without any permanent increase in 
national security or international stability.”74 Pearson’s successor, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, voiced 
even more determined opposition to missile defence. While he agreed to allow the testing of the 
Cruise missile over Alberta in 1984, his government viewed the initiative as a new and 
dangerous escalation of the arms race.
75
 It was the Trudeau Liberals, of course, who had decided 
in 1969 to remove nuclear weapons from Canada’s defence system.76 
 The Liberal’s antipathy for the program was apparent during the course of the debates on 
SDI in the House of Commons. In December, 1984, before Canada was officially asked to 
partake in SDI, Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) Jean Chretien stated: “[t]he Star Wars 
system is a new dangerous development.”77 On 12 March 1985, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy 
requested that the Canadian government ask the US Administration to cancel SDI.
78
 John Turner, 
the LPC leader and former Prime Minister, echoed concerns about the initiative’s impact on arms 
control and strategic stability when he said: 
[w]e believe in speaking out to both superpowers regarding constructive dialogue in the 
search for an end to the arms race. This is why we suggested in an earlier amendment that 
the Strategic Defence Initiative be put on the agenda at Geneva for discussion between 
superpowers.
79
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“Why,” Turner asked, “are we opposed to SDI? It is because we believe it is a new escalation. 
The Russians will not let the Americans do it and not match it.”80 Following the US invitation to 
Canada to support the initiative, the Liberals routinely declared their opposition to the program 
and to Canadian participation in it. 
 
2.4.2 The New Democratic Party  
 The NDP expressed at least as much hostility to SDI as did the Liberal Party.
81
 The 
House of Commons caught a glimpse of the NDP’s opposition to the program when its leader, 
Ed Broadbent, declared in the House of Commons on 12 March 1985:  
[t]he important point about this scheme is that it came from Mr. Reagan and a handful of 
his advisers. It was attacked by the Republicans in Congress. It was attacked by defence 
experts. It was attacked by church groups. It has, in fact, been attacked by western allies of 
the United States, who have been temporarily kept quiet, as being either totally irrational as 
a concept for defence on the one hand, or destabilizing on the other, or both….82  
 
Broadbent pointed out that SDI would “fundamentally change the strategic relationship.”83 
Additionally, NDP MP Pauline Jewitt denounced the program as “another round in the nuclear 
arms race”84 and later asked the government to deliver an “emphatic no” to Canadian 
participation in SDI and to the concept itself.
85
 
The NDP’s stance was unwavering during the remainder of the spring and summer of 
1985. As an article in the Globe and Mail revealed, days before Mulroney’s decision to not 
participate, Broadbent was “dead set against Canadian participation in the U.S. Star Wars 
program,” as statements made in Washington the day before confirmed.86  
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2.4.3 The Progressive Conservative Party 
There is evidence that mounting concerns within the Progressive Conservative Party 
(PCP) about the international strategic balance had an impact on the Mulroney government. 
While a majority of PCP supporters were initially in favor of participation, a Globe and Mail 
Crop poll in August of 1985 found that over 25% of those polled were opposed. More 
importantly, as Bow says, the PCP’s internal polling indicated that, like the broader electorate, 
opposition to the proposal was growing steadily within the party during that summer.
87
  
 Ambivalence was most evident among PCP members who were colloquially identified as 
“Red Tories.”88 Several Cabinet Ministers were opposed to participation, but the most prominent 
Red Tories critical of SDI were Joe Clark and Douglas Roche who, Lennox asserts, made efforts 
to work with the leaders of other countries to oppose SDI.
89
 Having served briefly as Prime 
Minister in 1979 and occupying the post of Secretary of External Affairs in the Mulroney 
government, Clark was the most influential opponent of the program within the cabinet. Various 
speeches revealed his distaste for the initiative. At the United Nations in September 1984, for 
example, Clark delivered a speech asking other smaller powers to join Canada in encouraging 
“the superpowers to ban weapons in outer space.”90 According to Lennox, this was in “direct 
opposition to the initiative that Reagan had outlined in his ‘Star Wars’ speech,” even before the 
President extended the invitation to Canada to join the initiative. At a NATO meeting in 
December of the same year, Clark expressed particular concern about SDI and referred to a 
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growing rift between himself and Canada’s Minister of National Defence, Robert Coates, who 
approved of the program.
91
 
In the House of Commons on 21 January 1985 Clark stated “in the light of significant 
Soviet advances in ballistic missile defence research in recent years and deployment of an actual 
ballistic missile defence system, it is only prudent that the West keep abreast of the feasibility of 
such projects.”92 But this was at a time, before Washington’s invitation, when it was assumed 
that the initiative would proceed within the bounds of the ABM Treaty.
93
 According to Sean M. 
Maloney: SDI “posed another set of complex problems that were subject to Clark’s interference” 
in the sense that he sought to undermine any governmental efforts to join the program.
94
 In the 
end, Clark refused to sign a joint memorandum from the Department of External Affairs (DEA) 
and the Department of National Defence (DND) proposing participation in research in the 
summer of 1985.
95
 
As Canada’s Disarmament Ambassador to the United Nations, Douglas Roche was 
uniquely positioned to criticize Reagan’s program. He actively lobbied the government to say no 
to Star Wars “on that grounds that it [was] de-stabilizing and certain to escalate the nuclear arms 
race.”96 As a member of the secret group Mulroney formed—“a collection of senior party 
members from the Red Tory spectrum”—Roche also co-authored a report sent to the Prime 
Minister, advising him to avoid participation. Furthermore, Roche wrote a letter to Arthur 
Kroeger, a distinguished public servant whom Mulroney had dispatched to study potential 
involvement in SDI, stating: “Canada must have no part in a program which threatens to send the 
                                                     
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Legault and Fortmann, 414. 
93
 Ibid. 
94
 Sean M. Maloney, “Better Late Than Never: Defence During the Mulroney Years,” in Transforming the Nation: 
Canada and Brian Mulroney, ed. Raymond B. Blake(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 142. 
95
 Douglas Roche, Creative Dissent: A Politician’s Struggle for Peace (Ottawa: Novalis, 2008), 196. 
96
 Ibid. 
25 
 
arms race reeling uncontrollably into the presently unweaponized region of outer space.”97 
Roche was not a leading member of the Cabinet, but he clearly added to the mounting opposition 
within the PCP to the initiative.   
 
2.5 The Bureaucracy 
 According to Ross, the SDI proposal ''flabbergasted” numerous Canadian officials 
because it was completely at odds with the “fairly stable and predictable set of policy axioms 
governing the Soviet-American strategic relationship.”98 An examination of the most relevant 
departments, namely the Departments of External Affairs (DEA) and National Defence (DND), 
reveals that the debate among senior bureaucrats did not always mirror the debate carried out by 
the public; for example, both departments eventually did support participation. But officials in 
both departments expressed concerns about the impact of the program upon arms control and 
strategic stability. 
 
2.5.1 The Department of External Affairs 
DEA’s support for arms control and disarmament had a long history. Under the 
leadership of Lester B. Pearson, External Affairs became actively engaged in arms control 
negotiations in the 1950s. Both during and after this period, Canada found itself a member of the 
Disarmament Commission, the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and the International 
Atomic Association, among others, all of which contributed to the notion that Canada “punched 
above its weight.” Canada was also a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (1970) and 
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Outer Space (1967) treaties, as well as a vocal supporter of the ABM Treaty (1972).
99
 As the 
principal department overseeing involvement and negotiations in arms control, DEA had a 
seasoned track record of support for arms control and disarmament, which was anything but 
abandoned in the face of SDI.  
DEA’s support for arms control was evident during the Geneva talks in 1984 when the 
Liberal government considered proposing a ban on the development of high-altitude anti-satellite 
systems. Although some officials in DEA worried that such a proposal might damage Canada-
US cooperation revolving around NORAD and other interests in space, and acknowledged more 
generally the destabilizing effects of such systems, the Department encouraged the government 
to proceed. Yet it hoped the Geneva Summit on arms control, occurring in November of 1985, 
would produce fruitful results, and it remained opposed to destabilizing ventures, which might 
threaten negotiations.  
Further evidence of DEA’s focus on arms control and the maintenance of strategic 
stability can be found in the foreign policy review accompanying the PCP’s ascent to office. In 
May of 1985, the Department released a green paper
100
 entitled Competitiveness and Security: 
Directions for Canada’s International Relations. The green paper described arms control as one 
of five priorities for Canada’s foreign policy101 and affirmed that Canada’s “security interests 
demand that we play our part in western defence and in arms control and disarmament.”102 
Maureen Apple Molot and Brian W. Tomlin concisely outlined DEA’s views as follows: 
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The commencement of new arms control talks in Geneva and the Reagan-Gorbachev 
summit were strongly supported by Canada. Although Canada recognizes the difficulties of 
arms control negotiations, the government does see a role for itself in encouraging 
superpower dialogue and in multilateral arms control discussions.
103
 
 
 In spite of the fact the green paper described SDI as a prudent undertaking given the 
Soviet’s own research efforts, it also acknowledged the US’s commitment not to go beyond the 
ABM treaty. More importantly, it said that SDI “raise[d] a host of questions” for Canadians, 
including the potential to undermine strategic stability.
104
 But the key factor again for DEA was 
the maintenance of positive Canada-US relations. Because SDI was such an important 
component of Reagan’s presidency, most, although certainly not all, DEA officials believed 
Canada could not afford to say no to participation and, therefore proposed that Canada 
participate. 
 
2.5.2 The Department of National Defence 
 Like DEA, DND had a major interest in promoting arms control for the sake of national 
and collective security.
105
 An example of congruence between the two Departments on these 
kinds of issues was their “…perfect agreement on the ‘destabilizing’ nature of high altitude Anti-
Satellite systems” –– which were inextricably linked to missile defence.106 Strategic stability was 
evidently an important issue for both Departments.  
Middlemiss and Sokolsky make it clear, however, that DND’s chief focus was on SDI’s 
impact on NORAD, as well as the opportunities that participation in the initiative might 
provide.
107
 The initiative was viewed as having ramifications for continental defence
108
 and, 
                                                     
103
 Molot and Tomlin, 5-6. 
104
 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada’s International 
Relations (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985), 39. 
105
 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 162. 
106
 Legault and Fortmann, 410. 
107
 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 183-184. 
28 
 
therefore, posed questions regarding Canadian sovereignty. However, participation also 
ostensibly held benefits for the department. As Ross points out, DND had been politically 
marginalized since the 1960s and SDI “seemed to hold out some real prospect for financial-
budgetary gains for DND’s own woefully underfunded capital equipment account.”109 After 
weighing the pros and cons, the Department finally agreed that Canada should join the program. 
According to Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, “it was impossible to reach 
interdepartmental agreement on a common draft of the fundamental problems raised” by the 
initiative.
110
 Nonetheless, at one point during the summer of 1985, the two Departments sent a 
joint memo to Cabinet proposing that the Canadian government cooperate with the US on SDI 
research.
111
 In the end, for both Departments, the program’s implications for the Canada-US 
relationship seem to have been the more salient issue.  
 
2.6 The Reluctant Prime Minister 
The importance of Canadian Prime Ministers in the foreign and defence policy-making 
process cannot be understated. Their seminal role as the chief executive and leader of the 
legislature denotes the position’s sweeping prerogative and pre-eminence concerning important 
foreign policy issues.
112
 The SDI invitation was no exception as Mulroney made the final 
decision in face of intense societal, governmental, and political pressures. 
 Stating that “[g]ood relations, super relations, with the United States will be the 
cornerstone of our foreign policy,” during the 1984 election campaign,113 Mulroney came to 
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office set on “refurbishing” Canada’s damaged relationship with the US. From the outset, 
Mulroney made good on this pledge as attested to by his close relationship with and access to 
Reagan, which was reflected in the annual summits between the leaders.
114
 As Sokolsky and 
Jockel write, this desire to refurbish the Canada-US relationship necessitated that Mulroney 
handle the SDI invitation with great care, “lest the good will of the Reagan administration, and of 
the president in particular, be diminished.”115 
Although Mulroney favored the program for the sake of improving Canadian-American 
relations and because of the possibility of employment spinoffs,
116
 he was not a supporter of the 
proposal itself. In a private conversation documented in Kevin Newman’s The Secret Mulroney 
Tapes, Mulroney said “I don’t think Star Wars is a big deal. I’ve never been impressed with the 
whole concept. I can’t see how we’d gain anything from it. I don’t think we’d participate. It 
doesn’t make any sense to me.”117 Likewise, his memoirs reveal that he “found the thought of the 
weaponization of space and the creation of another costly arms race extremely disconcerting.”118 
So even for the Prime Minister, it is fair to suggest that arms control was a prominent concern. 
In an effort to shed light on what course of action his government should follow, 
Mulroney sought the advice of two senior government officials, Allan Gotlieb and Arthur 
Kroeger. In the spring of 1985, Mulroney dispatched Kroeger, a respected public servant who 
served in the Privy Council Office, to Washington in order to examine the scientific, economic, 
and strategic implications for Canadian participation in SDI. Kroeger informed Mulroney that 
Canadian firms could expect only around $30 million from contracts, a paltry sum considering 
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the magnitude of the program.
119
 After it became clear to the Prime Minister that SDI contract 
opportunities for Canadian firms would be minimal, Mulroney’s decision on SDI revolved 
around political calculations. 
Allan Gotlieb, Canada’s Ambassador to the US, contended in a letter to the Prime 
Minister that Canada should not reject SDI as it was “a concept too close to the president’s 
heart.” However, he also supported Canadian participation in SDI for its potential as a bargaining 
chip in the Geneva Talks on arms control. Additionally, he emphasized the need for Canada to 
make a clear distinction between missile defence research and missile deployment and to act so 
as to create an atmosphere that was conducive to improving Soviet-US relations.
120
  
Delivering advice contrary to Gotlieb’s was a secret committee composed of senior Red 
Tories, whom Mulroney called the “special consultants.” Senior among the consultants were 
Robert Stanfield, Hugh Segal, and Douglas Roche. In June, they reported to Mulroney, stating 
that “‘[p]ublic opinion, the uncertainty of the SDI project, and the risk of a large financial 
obligation in the future all suggest that the government should refrain from endorsing the SDI 
program.”121 
The opposition to the program across Canada stemming from concerns about arms 
control and strategic stability clearly rendered any decision to join the program politically 
problematic. The Progressive Conservatives had a majority in Parliament, indeed the largest in 
Canadian history, and there was little likelihood that the opposition parties could defeat the 
government on the SDI issue.
122
 However, the government’s position rested on a fragile coalition 
between Quebec and the western provinces that “[Mulroney] had so carefully put together” and 
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was unwilling to jeopardize.
123
 So even if concern for the integrity of the ABM and Outer Space 
treaties was not at the forefront of Mulroney’s own political calculations, public opposition, 
which was strongest in Quebec, ensured that arms control and disarmament affected the 
government’s final decision.  
 
2.7 The Polite No 
 After five months of deliberation, on 7 September 1985 Mulroney announced the 
Cabinet’s decision: “The Canadian Government,” he stated, “has reached the conclusion that the 
policies and priorities of Canada do not justify a government to government effort in support of 
SDI research.”124 This decision became known as the “polite no” and made Canada the sixth US 
ally to decide against participation,
125
 even though Canadian firms remained free to bid and work 
on contracts coming from the program. While Mulroney considered this decision an “honourable 
compromise,”126 various authors suggest neither the Canadian electorate nor the Reagan 
Administration was satisfied with the government’s decision.127 Many Canadians wanted a 
firmer rejection of SDI as a concept, and the US clearly wanted direct government-to-
government participation, or at least political support for the initiative.  
Most sources contend the impact of the Mulroney government’s decision on the Canada-
US relationship, and on the relationship between the Prime Minister and President, was minimal. 
Describing his response to Mulroney’s phone call informing him that Canada would not 
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participate, Reagan wrote “[a]ll in all I think there is no problem.”128 Lennox’s more recent study 
supports the notion that there was little political fallout in Washington: 
Washington was reportedly not even upset by Ottawa’s SDI decision. Reagan even thanked 
Mulroney for the opportunity to work with Canadian firms. At first blush this is surprising, 
given the intensive lobbying Reagan and his staff had done in Ottawa to bring Canada on 
board with SDI.
129
 
 
 
2.8 The End of SDI 
 The SDI program continued during the remainder of Reagan’s and George H. W. Bush’s 
presidencies and into President Bill Clinton’s first term. However, starting in 1987, the 
program’s goals were revised and, by 1991, its original goal of protecting the US from 
intercontinental missiles had largely evaporated. By the time Clinton became President in 1993, 
the Strategic Defense Initiative was no longer the title, and its financial allotment was drastically 
cut the following year. All in all, the US Administration spent approximately $85 billion on SDI 
research, a sum well beyond the original price tag, and produced very little in terms of tangible 
defence weaponry.
130
  As J. L. Granatstein writes, in terms of research, “Star Wars went 
nowhere.”131 Although the US continued to pursue missile defence research more modestly 
during the 1990s, the issue did not return in any notable fashion for Canadians until George W. 
Bush unveiled the National Missile Defense program in 2002. 
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Chapter 3 
Canada and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense Program 
3.1 Introduction 
 The end of the Cold War in 1991 drastically altered the political and strategic 
environment in which Canada and the United States operated. James G. Fergusson asserts that, 
after the demise of the Soviet Union, “the relevance of deterrence stability arguments simply 
evaporated overnight.”132 As the distribution of power underwent a radical shift from a bipolar to 
unipolar world, Canada’s geographic significance declined as it no longer found itself between 
two nuclear-armed superpowers. As a result, Canadian airspace ceased to be seen by US policy 
makers as strategically vital as it had been throughout the Cold War, even after the events of 11 
September 2001. In spite of the altered strategic atmosphere, Canada’s decision to reject 
participating in the United States’ Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program133 in 2005 
illustrates that Canadians’ discomfort with the notion of missile defence remained. This chapter 
demonstrates how concerns among Canadians about arms control and strategic stability, in this 
case, expressed chiefly through their opposition to the weaponization of space and its potential 
for igniting another arms race, was an important factor in the decision to forgo participation in a 
US missile defence program. The chapter describes the events leading up to the US decision to 
create GMD, along with Canada’s drawn-out decision to decline, and examines the opposition to 
the program by the public, political parties, the federal bureaucracy, and the Prime Minister. 
                                                     
132
 James G. Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954-2009: Déjà Vu All Over Again, (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2010), 3. 
133
 The program was commonly known as National Missile Defense, although it was renamed Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense in 2002. 
34 
 
3.2 Towards the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
 While, in a sense, the origins of GMD can be traced to Reagan’s SDI proposal, its genesis 
as a concept can be traced to the US political atmosphere of the late 1990s. In 1998, the 
Rumsfeld Commission released a report suggesting missiles posed a much greater danger to the 
US than previously estimated, heightening the apprehension of threats posed by North Korea, 
Iraq, and Iran, among other states. Shortly after the release of this report, North Korea launched a 
three-stage Taepodong-1 missile over Japanese airspace, compelling many members of the US 
Congress to demand the immediate development of a homeland missile defence system. 
Succumbing to political pressure after initial resistance, the Clinton Administration signed the 
National Missile Defense (NMD) Act in 1999.
134
 The NMD Act reads: 
It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an 
effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United 
States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or 
deliberate)….”135 
 
Even though this Act opened the door for a US missile defence program, due to a lack of 
confidence in the technology, Clinton chose not to proceed with it, thereby postponing the 
decision for his successor.
136
 The decision to move ahead with such a system had to wait until 
George W. Bush became President in January of 2001.  
 
3.2.1 The Return of the Neo-Conservatives 
 Republicans were, generally speaking, more inclined to support unilateralism in matters 
of national security than the Democrats. Most were passionate advocates of missile defence and 
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derided nuclear arms control as a redundant carry-over from the Cold War.
137
 Prior to winning 
the presidential election as the Republican candidate, Bush promised that he would “build 
effective missile defenses, based on the best available options, at the earliest possible date.”138 
Fergusson observes:  
With the election of Bush and the re-election of a Republican Majority in both Houses of 
Congress, there was little doubt that missile defence would proceed. Missile defence had 
long been central to Republican defence policy, and George W. Bush, like his father, was 
an ardent advocate.
139
  
Not surprisingly, Bush brought a number of neo-conservatives into key positions in his Cabinet 
who were supportive of an ABM program, principally because of what they perceived as a 
decline in US military might.
140
 These individuals, together with Bush himself, demonstrated 
early on that they were ready to implement a scaled-back version of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative.
141
   
 After his inauguration, the President moved the US towards a missile defence program 
expeditiously. Spending on missile defence was increased substantially, an outline of his missile 
defence vision was provided, and the Pentagon was directed to explore a broad swath of anti-
missile technologies.
142
 Most importantly, in a speech on 1 June 2001 at the National Defense 
University, Bush revealed his government’s intent to abrogate the ABM Treaty and create a 
working missile defence program.
143
 The events of 11 September 2001 and the security-focused 
atmosphere which followed in the US all but guaranteed a missile defence program would be 
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initiated.
144
 On 13 December 2001, Bush formally announced the United States’ withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty in six months time and reiterated his pledge to build a missile defence 
system to defend against rogue states and terrorists.
145
  
 
3.2.2 Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 
 Bush announced his decision to deploy two Ground-based Midcourse Defense systems at 
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and Fort Greely, Alaska, in December of 2002; both 
became operational in the fall of 2004. The other major aspect of the program was the placement 
of high-frequency radars at Fort Greeley and Thule, Greenland.
146
 In the long-term, GMD would 
be a layered system, including land, sea, and space, which would be able to defend against all 
types of ballistic missiles.
147
 In spite of its broad scope, the GMD program was far more modest 
than SDI, as it did not attempt to create a colossal shield capable of stopping massive attacks 
from Russia or China. Rather, GMD aimed to defend against a small number of missiles that 
might be launched by a rogue state or accidentally by a major power.
148
  
 Although the events of September 11, 2001 dampened domestic criticism of ABM in the 
US to a certain extent, GMD was framed as another “Star Wars” and subject to the same line of 
questioning. Some critics contended the technology was not advanced enough to proceed with a 
working program, as highlighted by some failures in the initial testing. Others lamented the 
budgetary cuts that the program would produce in other areas. The Administration’s argument 
that GMD would be “a 21st century approach to deterrence” was also routinely torn asunder by 
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critics.
149
 Russia’s criticism of GMD was somewhat muted in comparison to SDI, but its leaders 
argued that moving beyond the ABM Treaty posed a threat to strategic stability. The Chinese 
government indicated that it had the same concerns, considering itself even more threatened than 
Russia, largely because it possessed fewer long-range missiles.
150
 Even Clinton, prior to leaving 
office, declared that missile defence held the potential to engender a multi-sided arms race, 
increasing the risks of nuclear warfare.
151
 
 
3.3 Canadian Participation? 
Months after coming to office, Bush was calling for Canadian participation in a future 
BMD system.
152
 Yet Canada was neither pressured to join nor formally invited to participate 
until the government expressed interest in being at the table.
153
 As with SDI, the Bush 
administration was not asking Canada for money or territory—the president sought political and 
diplomatic support. Either way, the administration made clear it would go ahead with GMD 
regardless of Canada’s decision. Canadian support may not have been necessary for the 
functioning of the program, but it would aid the US government in garnering GMD international 
and domestic legitimacy. At minimum, helping bolster the program’s legitimacy was a matter of 
“diplomatic prudence” in an era of sub-par Canada-US relations.154  
Changes in US continental and strategic command unintentionally eased the possibility of 
Canadian participation. The decision to change the command of GMD from Space Command to 
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) in 2003 arguably rendered Canadian 
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participation through NORAD a separate venture from a future system in space.
155
 In theory, 
therefore, the government could participate and claim it was upholding Canada’s international 
arms control obligations, while demonstrating its commitment to continental defence and 
bilateral relations. The positive responses GMD received from most European leaders also eased 
the difficulty for Canada in deciding whether to participate.
156
 Lastly, Russia and China may 
have been disappointed by the US decision to rescind the ABM Treaty, but the lack of expected 
vitriolic rhetoric from these states meant Canada could no longer fall back on the Treaty as an 
excuse to opt out of missile defence.
157
 Despite minimal contributions required and favorable 
circumstances, the GMD question would prove to be a significant dilemma for Canada’s 
governing Liberals. 
 
3.3.1 False Signals 
 Contrasting with Mulroney’s handling of SDI, the decision-making process for GMD was 
drawn out and awkwardly communicated. This contrast was illustrated in the years prior to the 
final decision in February 2005 when participation became increasingly controversial and the 
principal issue for the Canadian government.
158
 During this period, the issues were complicated 
by a series of misleading signals from political actors, which led observers to assume Canada 
intended to participate in GMD. Such a signal was given at the commencement of negotiations 
between Canada and the US in June 2003 while Jean Chretien was Prime Minister. The Canadian 
government made no effort to clarify if the commencement  of negotiations meant that Canada 
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had agreed to participate in the proposed program.
159
 In fact Chretien avoided making any 
decision on the issue, especially after Bush started to talk about placing weapons in outer 
space.
160
 Thus the decision, or “political hand grenade,”161 was left to Chretien’s successor, Paul 
Martin, who became leader of the Liberal party and majority government in December of 2003. 
Martin expressed interest in Canadian participation in GMD from the outset, having 
campaigned in favour of the idea during the Liberal leadership race in 2003. If the initiation of 
negotiations failed to clarify the intent of the Chretien administration, the letter sent by Martin’s 
Minister of National Defence, David Pratt, to Washington did the same thing. The Bush 
Administration asked the Martin government to signal its support for the program in advance of 
the commencement of negotiations.
162
 Pratt responded in January 2004 in a letter to US 
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, which was subsequently posted on the DND website: 
 [W]e believe that our two nations should move on an expedited basis to amend the 
NORAD agreement to take into account NORAD’s contribution to the missile defence 
mission… it is our intent to negotiate in the coming months a Missile Defence Framework 
Memorandum of Understanding with the United States with the objective of including 
Canada as a participant in the current US missile defence program and expanding and 
enhancing information exchange.
163
  
As Fergusson explains, at this point, it was not a question of whether Canada would participate 
or not, but rather what Canada’s role in the program would be.164 Participation seemed even 
more certain when, in February 2004, DND divulged plans to participate in radar tests for the 
program, issuing tentative contracts valued at $700,000.
165
  
By March of 2004, however, Canadian officials were ordered to cease work on missile 
defence and desist from making any public statements. An election was looming, and the Martin 
                                                     
159
 Fergusson, 207. 
160
 Lennox, 84. 
161
 Stein and Lang, 161. 
162
 Fergusson, 237-238. 
163
 Ibid., 239. 
164
 Ibid., 207. 
165
 Lennox, 85. 
40 
 
government had come to view participation in GMD as politically unwise.
166
 After the Liberal 
government was reduced to minority status in June 2004, the GMD decision was again delayed 
because of a deeply divided caucus and increasing opposition among Canadians.
167
 Yet, even 
with efforts toward participation on hold, Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang argued that 
“Canada appeared to be inching its way into BMD through the NORAD door.”168 This so-called 
back door to participation ostensibly resulted from the re-negotiation of NORAD, leading up to 
its renewal in August 2004. The terms of renewal allowed NORAD to pass its missile warning 
information to USNORTHCOM, which was delegated the task of commanding GMD. As a 
result, some critics contended that Canada had already embraced missile defence, while others 
became increasingly skeptical of Ottawa’s intentions.169  
One of the most misleading and troubling incidents for the Martin government involved 
comments made by Frank McKenna, the incoming Canadian Ambassador to the US and a 
proponent of GMD. During a media scrum on Parliament Hill in January, 2005, McKenna told 
reporters that, because Canada agreed to have NORAD deliver information about incoming 
missiles to USNORTHCOM, the country was implicitly involved. This was interpreted by the 
media as a signal that the government would formally sign on to GMD, at a time when the 
Martin government was actually in the process of opting for outright rejection.
170
 It did so 
formally by announcing the decision on 24 February 2005 in the House of Commons.  
The remainder of this chapter will explore the reasons for this rejection, focusing on the 
public, political parties, the federal bureaucracy, and the Prime Minister’s evolving views on the 
program.  
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3.4 The Public 
The GMD program attracted less media and political attention than SDI. This did not 
mean that Canadians appraised it with any less contempt. Steven Staples, an ardent critic who 
wrote a detailed account of Canada’s rejection of GMD, notes that a Canadian decision to join 
the program “would have flown into a public-opinion hurricane.”171 Even as early as 2001, 
David Rudd points out, Canadian reactions “ranged from polite skepticism to angry 
rejectionism.”172 While some Canadians opposed GMD as an affront to Canadian sovereignty,173 
the distaste of others resulted from a loathing of President George W. Bush and a rejection of his 
Administration’s foreign policy, specifically the controversial invasion of Iraq in 2003. Among a 
variety of interest groups, academics, and leading public figures, there was a sizeable opposition 
that was premised upon a desire to maintain strategic stability and a discomfort with the prospect 
of weapons in space. 
Although there was nothing comparable to the peace movement of the 1980s, a few 
organizations voiced their opposition to the program. Basil Hargrove, President of the Canadian 
Auto Workers, contended that GMD was financially wasteful, did little to enhance security, and 
threatened world peace through weaponizing space and propelling a new arms race.
174
 Canadian 
churches, including Catholic, Anglican, Orthodox, Lutheran, Presbyterian and United, also 
thought Canada should forgo participation, sending a letter to Paul Martin in March of 2004, 
which stated: "[t]he weaponization of space and related BMD developments are hollow attempts 
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at technical solutions that only intensify the nuclear threat…."175 The Council of Canadians 
organized rallies on Parliament Hill to draw attention to their opposition. Even a sizeable ad hoc 
group called the Canadian Coalition to Oppose Missile Defence was established,
176
 not to 
mention other smaller groups like the Vancouver Island Public Interest Group which agreed that 
the US MD program would cause a new arms race.
177
 
 
3.4.1 Opinion Polls 
Polling between 2003 and 2005 highlighted the growing opposition to GMD among the 
Canadian electorate. A poll taken by SES Research in May of 2003 found 61 percent of 
Canadians supported participation while only 24 percent was either strongly or somewhat 
opposed.
178
 In 2004 pollsters were getting mixed results, although it was evident that support for 
GMD was eroding across Canada.
179
 In March, an Ipsos-Reid poll found that 69 percent of 
Canadians were opposed.
180
 A poll conducted by Environics and the Centre for Research and 
Information on Canada in the fall showed that 52 percent of Canadians were opposed, 31 percent 
of which were strongly against participation.
181
 Just after Martin announced that Canada would 
not participate in the program, a COMPAS poll reported 54 percent of Canadians were 
opposed.
182
 A Decima poll conducted around the same time showed that support for Martin’s 
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decision was widespread, including men and women, senior citizens, teenagers, urban and rural 
constituents, as well as a majority of respondents in every province. In fact, the only supporters 
of GMD were Conservative Party supporters and some business groups, including the Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, and the domestic aerospace 
industry.
183
 
 
3.4.2 Quebec 
The opposition to GMD in Quebec warrants special attention. Prior to Martin’s decision, 
a full 75 percent of Quebecers polled were against participation—the highest level of opposition 
to the program in the country by a sizeable margin. Another poll showed Quebecers who 
opposed the program were “firmer in their beliefs than supporters, and more resistant to 
arguments in favour of missile defence…” compared to other Canadians.184 As will be discussed 
later, because Quebec was such an important electoral battleground, its sizeable opposition to 
GMD was disproportionately influential. 
 
3.4.3 Academics and Notables  
 A number of academics and notable public figures opposed the missile program. Lloyd 
Axworthy, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and political scientist Michael Byers 
suggested that signing on to GMD would imply agreement with Bush’s unilateral foreign policy 
and would contradict Canada’s historic support for arms control and disarmament. Moreover, it 
would discredit current international treaties that set limits on weapons in space.
185
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among the most vocal opponents, contended that GMD would result in “Armageddon,” as it was 
“…unquestionably leading to accelerated nuclear proliferation, major world destabilization and a 
substantial escalation of insecurity throughout the world.”186 Douglas Roche, a former 
Progressive Conservative Senator and Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Committee, 
was one of many leading public figures who argued that GMD would start another arms race 
among other world powers; they had, he declared, already begun upgrading their nuclear arsenals 
to deal with missile defences. Along with this new arms race would come global instability and a 
greater chance of nuclear war. In a letter published in the Edmonton Journal in November of 
2004, Roche wrote: “only a fool would believe that the startup system is not inextricably linked 
to future weapons in space.”187 A number of Canadian celebrities, including Bryan Adams, 
David Suzuki, Sarah McLachlan, and Stompin’ Tom Connors, also expressed their disagreement 
with the prospect of participation by signing a letter to the Prime Minister in March 2004 opting 
for rejection. The letter focused on concerns about strategic stability: 
Canadian involvement in U.S. missile defence would undermine decades of Canadian 
efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons…. It would require the reversal of a 30-year 
Canadian policy opposing the weaponization of space…. A new global arms race is a likely 
consequence, as existing nuclear powers seek to maintain a credible deterrence by 
strengthening their retaliatory arsenals of missiles and warheads.
188
 
 
Maintenance of global stability was a goal, as well, of those who favoured the program. It 
would be an effective means, supporters argued, of influencing US strategic decisions. David 
Rudd, for example, asserted that a decision to join the missile defence program could be 
“constructive” in giving Canada the opportunity to steer the program away from one involved 
with weapons in space and thus avoid another arms race.
189 
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3.5 Political Parties 
While the position of the opposition Conservatives in Parliament remained ambiguous 
and opportunistic, those of the other opposition parties were strongly against participation. 
Indeed, the Bloc Québécois and NDP constantly criticized the Liberal government, demanding 
that it reject GMD at every stage of the decision-making process. Making Martin’s decision even 
more difficult was staunch opposition among members of his own caucus and party.  
 
3.5.1 Ambiguity from the Official Opposition 
The Conservative Party of Canada was hardly the same coalition of forces that existed in 
the Mulroney era. Influenced much less than in previous years by its progressive wing, the party 
had few prominent members who opposed missile defence on ideological or moral grounds. 
Nonetheless, even the Conservatives under Stephen Harper were reluctant to give full support to 
GMD, because of the possibility that such an endorsement would erode the party’s electoral base 
or cause a divide within the party itself. 
Initially the Conservatives appeared to support GMD. In February 2004, they helped the 
Liberal government defeat a Bloc Québécois motion demanding that the government oppose 
missile defence and cease negotiations with the Bush Administration.
190
 Yet as time passed there 
was evidence that Harper, in dealing with his caucus, was looking more for a desirable political 
outcome than one predicated on ideology, principle or policy. Even in the House of Commons, 
the Conservative position was either vague or muted on the matter of missile defence. Unlike the 
BQ and NDP leaders, Harper did not argue for or against participation but rather criticized the 
Liberal government’s backtracking and ambiguity on the issue.  
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Under Harper’s leadership, the Canadian Alliance Party191 introduced a motion in the 
House of Commons in June of 2003 to “support giving NORAD responsibility for the command 
of any system developed to defend North America against ballistic missiles.”192 However, the 
2004 election platform of the new Conservative Party was devoid of any reference to missile 
defence. Even after Martin’s decision to decline participation, the Party’s position on GMD 
remained vague, its 2005 Policy Declaration giving support to “Canada's participation in 
negotiation of a North American Missile Defence System on the clear understanding that any 
agreement must serve Canada's interest.”193  
As Globe and Mail journalist John Ibbitson astutely assessed, there was more to the 
Conservative Party’s public ambiguity than just simple electoral support: 
Mr. Harper knows that voting against missile defence — even though he has repeatedly 
supported it in principle — would lead to a humiliating Liberal defeat. Endorsing the 
motion, on the other hand, would not only rescue Mr. Martin, his political archenemy, 
from a predicament, but could exacerbate the Red Tory/Reform split inside his own 
party.
194
 
The fact that the party was unwilling to make a firm stand in these circumstances suggests either 
societal or intra-party concerns for strategic stability and the strong distaste for Bush was 
influential. 
 
3.5.2 The New Democratic Party 
 From GMD’s onset the NDP was opposed to Canadian participation and to the existence 
of the program itself. The party’s position was consistent with the one that it had put forward 
against SDI in 1985, deriding the new initiative as a destabilizing force in global affairs, which 
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would invoke a new arms race in outer space. The NDP’s espoused abhorrence to the prospect of 
a Canadian role in the program was boldly declared in the 2004 election platform, which claimed 
the party would firmly oppose “any Canadian participation in the grossly expensive Star Wars 
missile defence scheme, which will result in the weaponizing of space and does nothing to 
protect us from terrorism, and promoting the proposed Space Preservation Treaty.”195   
This stance was maintained and strongly advanced in the House of Commons in 2004 and 
early 2005, when the NDP expressed the clearest opposition to missile defence of any party. As 
Stein and Lang say, “[t]he NDP hammered the government for going to bed with the Americans 
on BMD.”196 Party leader Jack Layton articulated the NDP’s stance on 6 December 2004: 
Missile defence is going to increase the build-up of arms globally. It is going to lead to the 
weaponization of space. It is going to take away from Canada's credibility in arguing for 
disarmament. When will the Prime Minister stand up and say that he has heard the 
evidence, and that Canada will simply say no to missile defence?
197
 
 
NDP member Bill Blaikie declared on 2 December 2004 that GMD “… is not just about the 
weaponization of space. It is also about the prospect for a new arms race. This can happen with 
or without the weaponization of space.”198 Such statements help clarify the nature of the NDP’s 
opposition, which was evidently rooted in concerns for strategic stability and arms control. 
 
3.5.3 The Bloc Québécois 
 The Bloc Québécois (BQ), absent from the party system during the controversy 
surrounding SDI, was also vociferously opposed to participation. Their stance was based on the 
widespread resentment of Bush, fear of militarization, doubts about GMD’s feasibility and costs, 
as well as the prospects of the weaponization of space and a new arms race. 
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 The BQ’s stance on the campaign trail in 2004 and in the House of Commons following 
the election highlighted the salience of concern about arms control and strategic stability. The 
2004 election platform declared the party would oppose “Canada’s participation in the anti-
missile defence shield and campaign in favor of an international treaty forbidding the 
militarization of space.”199 Other comments during the election made note of the destabilizing 
nature of the program, involvement in which the BQ was adamantly opposed. 
The Bloc Quebecois’s activities in the House of Commons bar any doubt concerning the 
party’s stance. In February 2004, the Bloc proposed a motion to cease negotiations with the US 
on GMD. After the motion was defeated, the party continued to denounce the program routinely. 
Party leader Gilles Duceppe equated participation with signing “a blank cheque for the 
militarization of space….”200 Caucus member Claude Bachand, among others, added that 
partaking in GMD would undermine Canada’s credibility as an advocate of arms control and 
tarnish its international reputation.
201
 The program, Paul Crête stated in 2004, was at odds with 
the values of Quebec society: “[i]f there is one thing on which Quebeckers agree, it is the 
inadvisability of getting involved in the development of a missile defence system.”202 
 
3.5.4 The Liberal Party of Canada 
 The LPC’s traditional opposition to missile defence and its commitment to arms control 
and strategic stability continued even after the end of the Cold War. As Lloyd Axworthy, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Chretien government, argued, GMD was not only unreliable 
but could also undermine strategic stability and arms control arrangements, as well as precipitate 
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a new arms race.
203
 Yet such sentiments did little to prevent Chretien from moving towards 
joining the US program in the pursuit of improved relations. By the time Martin became prime 
minister, a number of prominent Liberals supported the program, including leading Cabinet 
Ministers Bill Graham and Scott Brison.
204
  
But it became apparent to most observers that GMD was too controversial an issue on 
which to spend political capital needlessly. Likely recognizing the electoral costs of taking a 
position on GMD, the LPC’s 2004 election platform under the new leader, Paul Martin was 
bereft of any mention of the program. In fact, the platform’s section on Canada’s foreign policy 
did not even mention the North American defence relationship or the state of Canada’s relations 
with the US. The focus fell on bolstering the Canadian Forces for missions abroad (specifically 
Afghanistan), nation-building, and combating disease in Africa.
205
 Beyond the skepticism about 
GMD among the electorate, this absence resulted from the divide within the party itself.  
By February 2005, the number of Liberals dissidents had grown as public support for 
participation continued to decline. According to Liberal MP Pat O’Brien, chairman of the House 
of Commons Defence Committee, nearly two-thirds of the Liberal caucus opposed joining the 
US initiative at this time, himself included.
206
 High-ranking ministers stated publicly that Canada 
would not join a program that threatened to weaponize space and, instead, should encourage the 
US to rescind the program. In the House of Commons, Liberal MP Keith Martin succinctly 
summarized concerns about GMD: “[t]he government has made it very clear that Canada is 
firmly against the weaponization of space. It is something that the Prime Minister, the Minister 
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of National Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have made abundantly clear time and 
time again.”207 
The Canadian Alliance motion to place GMD under the command of NORAD brought to 
light the split in the Liberal caucus on the issue, as thirty-eight Liberal MPs voted against the 
motion. The BQ motion to end missile defence talks with the US also exposed the Liberal rift: 
instead of reigning in his caucus on the motion, Martin allowed its members to vote according to 
conscience. As a result, thirty Liberal MPs supported the motion.
208
 As Peter Hadekel of the 
Montreal Gazette pointed out, if the government had chosen participation, it might have 
produced “a massive rupture within the Liberal Party and caucus.”209 
Concern for strategic stability was also apparent among the Liberal Party rank and file. 
The Liberal youth wing planned to put forward a motion at the party convention in March of 
2005 forbidding Canadian participation. This motion had the support of the Quebec wing and the 
women’s caucus was considering putting forward a similar motion.210 Most analysts concluded it 
would pass at the convention, making a decision to join prior to the convention problematic, if 
not impossible afterwards.
211
  
 
3.6 The Bureaucracy 
 Whereas relations between Ottawa and Washington during the SDI discussions had been, 
for the most part, harmonious, deliberations between officials in the two countries on GMD were 
characterized by a marked degree of acrimony. For the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (DFAIT) and DND the most important priority was maintaining positive 
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relations with the US. Still, apprehensions related to the program’s possible effects on strategic 
stability instilled a degree of caution among government officials.  
 
3.6.1 The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade  
Opinion within DFAIT was divided with regard to participation. Even before the idea of 
GMD became public, it is clear that DFAIT had qualms about the ramifications of missile 
defence for strategic stability. The official government statement crafted by the Department’s 
officials on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in 1999 acknowledged that North Korea’s 
nuclear missile program posed a threat, but advocated a different response to that of the US.
212
 It 
stated that “Canada shares the international community’s desire to preserve and protect current 
economic and security benefits from the use of outer space while avoiding the creation of new 
and daunting military competitions in the future.”213 The statement articulated Canada’s 
continued support for the ABM Treaty and encouraged the nuclear powers to commit greater 
efforts to the reduction of nuclear arsenals.
214
 It also argued NATO security was enhanced by 
developments in arms control and disarmament.
215
 
These sentiments were hardly renounced when Bush introduced GMD. According to 
Lennox, the Department “recognized that BMD could be a destabilizing force in the world.”216 
Donald Barry cogently summarizes the Department’s concern for strategic stability once GMD 
was proposed:  
Foreign Affairs officials remained cautious. They were worried that missile defence could 
lead China, India and Pakistan to expand their nuclear arsenals and threaten international 
arms control arrangements. They were also concerned that it could lead to the 
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weaponization of space, something Bush had not ruled out. They, therefore, advised 
against an early decision.
217
 
 
DFAIT was cognizant of potential damage to Canada’s niche role in nuclear arms control 
if it joined GMD. In the twenty-first century, this role was more than just a historical legacy, as 
Canada had been active in promoting measures at the United Nations Preventing an Arms Race 
in Outer Space (PAROS). Yet by 2002, DFAIT had come to support participation in a missile 
defence program
218
 and, prior to Bush’s deployment announcement, recognized the necessity of 
discussing a role for Canada.
219
 The rationale for the policy change was that participation in the 
program would help mend Canada-US relations, which had deteriorated in the latter years of the 
Chretien government.  
 
3.6.2 The Department of National Defence  
 DFAIT’s concerns about destabilizing the international system were not at the forefront 
of the DND’s strategic thinking. The main issue for DND was the capacity of GMD and 
willingness of the US to protect Canadians.
220
 The official DND position was that an effective 
missile defence program covering North America could enhance Canadian security. Stein and 
Lang have argued that the real issue was improving Canada-US relations: 
[officials] were convinced that Canada would pay a huge price [if it did not participate]: 
the withering away of NORAD, and lost access to intelligence and surveillance 
information. They kept coming back to the same argument; they feared that if Ottawa 
slapped the Bush administration in the face again on an issue Washington regarded as vital 
to its national security, and one that would cost Ottawa little or nothing, then the Canada-
U.S. relationship would go into the deep-freeze at all levels.
221
 
 
Yet within DND there were clearly misgivings about the program. Declassified 
documents demonstrate that DND officials had the same fears as many Canadians that the US 
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program posed a “significant risk” to international efforts to ban weapons in space.222 Such 
misgivings did not materialize in policy recommendations, but undoubtedly contributed to the 
cautiousness of the Liberal Cabinet in considering policy alternatives.  
Most authors claim that both DFAIT and DND opted for participation in GMD because 
of a concern about the state of Canada-US relations. As one of Martin’s advisors said 
anonymously about advice from these Departments: “there was a hangover from the Iraq 
decision that gave a hysterical tone to all the advice that was coming to us. It boiled down to – 
‘You must do this, for God’s sake, or you will alienate the White House.’”223 This analysis 
seems to be supported by Martin’s memoirs, in which he stated that the only argument his 
officials provided was the US’s likely reaction Canada if it opted not to join the program.224 
After Martin started to waver, DFAIT and DND officials became even more adamant that 
Canada could not afford to resist the White House on such an important matter for US 
security.
225
  
 
3.7 The “Dithering” Prime Minister 
Like most Canadian prime ministers, Paul Martin came to office wanting to take a 
different direction from his predecessor and put his own stamp on Canada’s foreign policy. In an 
assessment of Martin’s foreign policy during his first year in office, Andrew Cohen wrote: “[i]n 
North America, Martin wants to mend fences with the United States, which means agreeing to 
protect and tighten the border and embracing missile defence, albeit reluctantly.”226 The need to 
repair relations with Washington was indeed a top priority for the Prime Minister, as Chretien’s 
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decision not to join the US in the 2003 invasion of Iraq was poorly communicated and caused 
considerable damage to Canada-US relations.
227
 Participating in GMD was considered the 
logical first step towards refurbishing relations—one Martin would pursue until it became too 
politically costly. 
As Martin’s memoirs reveal, the prime minister was not a proponent of missile defence. 
From a defence and security perspective, he thought GMD was neither cost-effective nor 
addressed real threats posed by terrorists. Moreover, he pointed out that such a program held the 
potential to be destabilizing even if the theory of deterrence had become irrelevant.
228
 Like his 
colleagues in Cabinet, he was evidently nervous to join a program that might include a space-
based component. Yet the priority of improving relations with the US initially dominated his 
thinking; he wrote: “if the Americans were going ahead with BMD anyway, I thought there 
might be some virtue in Canada being at the table.”229 
 In his memoirs, Martin provides an explanation of the evolution of his thinking on GMD. 
His first concern was the impact that a negative decision would have on the possibility of the 
renewal of NORAD. This concern was largely abated in August, 2004 when NORAD was 
renewed. His next concern was to ensure that Canada would never be asked to commit any 
funding if it participated.
230
 And finally, he wanted a guarantee that “the system was designed 
with as much concern for Canadian lives and territory as American.”231 In particular, he wanted 
Canada to be involved in designing the program and a protocol by which Canadian cities were 
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not sacrificed – in the event of a missile attack – in order to save a US city.232 These concerns, he 
explains in his memoirs, went unanswered: 
[a]s the weeks passed, I could not get the answer to my questions and it became 
increasingly obvious that someone, either in the U.S. Defence Department or at our 
Department of National Defence was stalling on my requests. I was getting increasingly 
frustrated…. I was becoming more and more doubtful about signing onto BMD.233 
 
 By 2004 the Prime Minister ceased making clear statements about GMD, not only in 
public, but in caucus and cabinet meetings too.
234
 Aware of a waning of support for his 
leadership within the caucus and desiring to avoid needlessly spending his political capital, he 
tasked the new and popular Defence Minister, Bill Graham with getting support for the GMD. 
According to Stein and Lang, Martin asked Graham “to sell BMD to an increasingly recalcitrant 
Liberal caucus that knew very little about either the substance or the history of missile defence,” 
as well as a skeptical public and media, which Stein and Lang described as an “impossible 
assignment.”235 
Publicly, Martin asserted that Canadian participation would be impossible if GMD 
involved weapons in space. It is fairly clear that neither Canadian nor US officials were able to 
convince the Prime Minister that GMD and space weapons were mutually exclusive, although 
Washington promised to allow Canada to opt out if the program moved in this direction.
236
 The 
public was certainly not convinced of that and, as a result, put pressure on the government to 
make a negative decision.  
An examination of the foreign policy review promulgated by Martin after becoming 
Prime Minister in 2004 provides another indication of the direction in which he wanted to push 
Canada and why GMD was rejected. The final report released in April of 2005, entitled 
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Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, identified 
many of the threats that the Bush administration was targeting, including international terrorism 
and rogue states.
237
 But the foreign policy statement contained no reference to missile defence as 
a solution to these threats. Instead, it opted for diplomatic, multilateral, and preventive solutions. 
The strategy for preventing rogue states and terrorist organizations from acquiring WMDs would 
be designed by DFAIT, not by DND. Canada would use diplomatic channels like the G8, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of 
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The foreign policy statement also reiterated 
Canada’s longstanding policy goal of preventing an arms race in space.238  
A highly influential factor in Martin’s decision was domestic political conditions. The 
Liberal minority government relied on the parliamentary support of the Bloc and the NDP and, 
on this particular issue, their opposition was abundantly clear.
239
 Even within the Liberal Party, 
an affirmative decision would likely have eroded Martin’s support as leader or irreconcilably 
divided the cabinet and caucus. Furthermore, hostile public opinion polls, rooted in a ubiquitous 
detestation of President Bush, as well as apprehensions about weapons in space and a 
destabilized international environment, suggested there were worrisome electoral costs 
associated with participation. Quebec’s unshakeable opposition was especially important for the 
Liberals who were, as Stein and Lang write, “desperate for electoral gains in the province.”240 
For Martin, the GMD issue was politically problematic. 
Bush’s visit to Canada in November and December of 2004 served only to further 
attenuate the political viability of joining GMD. In spite of a prior agreement not to mention 
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missile defence, Bush raised the prospects of participation at a summit in Halifax. Because of his 
dismal approval ratings in Canada, this turned out to be a failed public diplomacy attempt and 
paradoxically, as Martin admitted, raised the political costs of participation for his government.  
 
3.8 Rejection 
On 24 February 2005, Pierre Pettigrew, the Minister of DFAIT, formally announced 
Canada would not partake in the US ballistic missile defence initiative: 
The U.S. has weighed the risk to its citizens and territory against available resources, and 
has decided to proceed with deployment of a missile defence system. This is their right, 
and we understand and respect their decision. 
     Canada, however, must act in its own interests, and must determine where its own 
priorities lie. We must determine where investments will bring the greatest tangible results. 
After careful consideration of the issue of missile defence, we have decided that Canada 
will not participate in the U.S. ballistic missile defence system at this time.
241
 
 
Bow points out that Martin, like Mulroney two decades earlier, declined to participate in missile 
defence in a manner that “[won]  points with voters at home, …[but] was rather provocative for 
Americans.”242 Because negotiations with the US had been ongoing, and the Martin government 
had agreed to amend the NORAD Agreement in 2004, the announcement on GMD was 
unexpected by the US Administration.
243
  
 Paul Cellucci, the US Ambassador to Canada, said a chief complaint of Washington was 
the manner in which the Canadian decision was delivered. Some members of the Bush 
Administration were furious, notwithstanding Canada’s support of GMD as a concept, on 
account of how the Canadian decision was communicated. Whereas Mulroney ensured that 
Reagan was aware of the pending decision prior to the government’s announcement, Martin 
failed to inform Bush until after the decision was aired by the press. In fact Martin had several 
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opportunities to inform Bush personally of his position at the NATO summit in Brussels, 
Belgium, days earlier but failed to do so.
244
 The President admitted he was angry that he was not 
informed of the decision at the Brussels Summit when the opportunity presented itself.
245
 
American Rear-Admiral Ian Mack informed Canadian officials that the mood in Washington 
engendered by Canada’s decision was neither pleasant nor understanding. He alleged that, in the 
minds of US officials, Canada had said no seven times in recent cases, and these people no 
longer considered Canada to be a reliable ally.
246
 
At home, critics contended the decision weakened NORAD and called into question 
Canada’s reliability as an ally and its ability to protect its own sovereignty.247 In reality, the 
decision would have little effect on Canada-US relations and neither NORAD nor Canadian 
sovereignty would be affected as a result. Bush pledged to defend Canada against ICBMs 
regardless and, as in most situations where there are differences between like-minded allies, the 
problems caused by the Martin government’s pronouncement eventually dissipated. David T. 
Jones noted accurately in May 2005 that “[t]he flare-up over Canadian non-participation in North 
American missile defence is now fading. Shortly, it will be just another memorably unpleasant 
chapter in recent politico-military bilateral relationship between the United States and 
Canada.”248 The Bush administration indeed soon came to welcome Canada’s concurrent 
decision to increase funding for border security and, shortly afterward, the adoption of a combat 
role for the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.
249
 Martin’s subsequent comment  on the impact of 
the decision on relations with the Bush administration showed that the damage had been 
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minimal: “I called Bush later. He took a week to get back to me, but my call with Bush was fine. 
BMD was much bigger here than it ever was there.”250 Celluci, among the fiercest advocates in 
the Bush administration of Canadian participation, seemed to agree, stating “it did no damage to 
Canada-U.S. Relations....”251  
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Chapter 4 
Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter seeks to answer the question: what is it about missile defence that has 
brought the Canadian people and their governments to reject or to choose not to participate in 
US-missile defence initiatives? The first section of the chapter explores the consistencies 
between the SDI and GMD cases in terms of the role played by the main political actors in 
Canada in making the case that US-led missile defence initiatives were unacceptable because of 
an overriding Canadian concern about arms control and strategic stability. The second section 
explores the viability of the notion that Canadian support for arms control and strategic stability 
was rooted in internationalism and, in particular, its focus on preserving world order. 
 
4.2 The Commitment to Arms Control and Strategic Stability 
 This thesis recognizes that there were a number of factors that influenced Canadians in 
their rejection of participation in the SDI and GMD initiatives. Canadian antipathy towards US 
President Reagan in the case of the SDI and President Bush in the case of GMD was an 
important factor. It is sometimes difficult to differentiate Canadian concerns about the missile 
technology from concerns about the broader thrust of US foreign policy under these two 
Presidents, considering both leaders were immensely unpopular in Canada. Secondly, each 
program was also plagued by skepticism regarding technological feasibility among political 
leaders and the public in Canada. The economic and security benefits of these initiatives for 
Canada were perceived as exaggerated and unlikely to be realized, which contributed to the lack 
of enthusiasm among Canadians. Thirdly, claims that Canadian sovereignty would be eroded by 
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these programs or that Ottawa would have no control over them whatsoever caused concern as 
well. What the research shows here is that a prominent factor in the missile defence decisions 
was an overriding concern about arms control and maintaining the strategic balance in the world. 
A summary of positions taken by the public, political parties, public service, and Prime Minister 
on the missile defence systems provides the evidence.   
 
4.2.1 The Public 
 There is little doubt that the Canadian electorate played a seminal role in the rejection of 
both missile defence initiatives. In 1985 opinion polls and the peace movement attested to the 
strong opposition to SDI in Canada. Although some polls in early 1985 found support for 
participation, it was markedly unenthusiastic. Moreover, most Quebecers came out fervently 
against participation. The Progressive Conservative Party relied on electoral support from both 
Western Canada and Quebec, and opting for involvement in missile defence would have 
threatened their tenuous hold in both places. As Chapter Two demonstrates, public opposition 
towards SDI was based, to a significant degree, on public perceptions of the initiative as an 
affront to arms control treaties and strategic stability. 
 In 2005, the public realm in Canada was devoid of a significant peace movement, but 
opinion polling indicates that public opposition to Bush’s GMD was even more widespread than 
to SDI. Again, various statements from interest groups, newspaper editorials, and prominent 
public figures highlight how concerns for arms control and strategic stability reflected the 
public’s distaste for the program. Widespread opposition among Quebecers seems to have been 
an even greater factor for the Liberal Party in 2005 than Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives 
two decades earlier as the Liberal Party was clearly desperate for electoral gains in the province.  
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 In light of the evidence, the conclusions drawn by Middlemiss and Sokolsky from the 
SDI case are as applicable in 2005 as they were in 1985. That nuclear weapons was at issue in 
both cases undoubtedly contributed to the divisive debates that transpired around the missile 
programs. Middelmiss and Sokolsky go further in proposing that “there is a certain ambivalence 
in Canadian opinion when the government’s support for specific U.S. and NATO policies and 
doctrines appears to be inconsistent with its espousal of the cause of arms control and 
disarmament.”252 This was certainly true in the cases of SDI and GMD. The evidence shows that 
strong public opposition was a major factor in both decisions. More specifically, the opposition 
of the Canadian public to both missile defence initiatives had, in Denis Stairs’s words, a 
“parameter-setting effect,”253 rendering participation politically unfeasible.    
 
4.2.2 The Political Parties 
 Parliamentary democracy made sure that neither the SDI nor the GMD decision was 
immune to pressures from political parties. The substance of policy pronouncements, posturing, 
and pressure from within all parties (with the exception of the Conservative Party of Canada in 
2005) highlighted arms control and strategic stability as issues in influencing the government’s 
decisions in both cases.  
 Opposition parties were forthright in their aversion to the prospect of Canada 
participating in missile defence. It is clear that concern for arms control and strategic stability 
dominated the NDP’s positions regarding each program. Although the BQ did not exist in 1985, 
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its appraisal of GMD in 2005 reflected the same preoccupation. Both the NDP and the Bloc 
consistently raised the issues of weapons in space, a new arms race, and a less stable strategic 
environment. There is also much evidence that concerns about arms control and strategic 
stability were among the chief reasons the Liberal Party disapproved of SDI while sitting as the 
Official Opposition in 1985. Among opposition parties in both cases, the Conservative Party of 
Canada in 2005 was the only party that refrained from denouncing GMD, which may have had 
as much to do with domestic political calculations as with policy. Certainly NDP and BQ 
opposition was critical in the lead up to the 2005 decision, largely because the Liberal 
government relied on the NDP for support in the House of Commons. 
 Moreover, both the Progressive Conservative and Liberal governments in 1985 and 2005 
faced strong opposition to participation in missile defence from within their own ranks. Red 
Tories like Joe Clark and Douglas Roche, who viewed SDI as an affront to arms control efforts 
and Cold War stability, clearly influenced Mulroney’s political calculations. The growing 
majority opposed to GMD in the Liberal cabinet and wider caucus in 2005 was even more 
noticeable, because of the minority government situation and the anticipation of an election.  
 
4.2.3 The Bureaucracy  
In light of DND’s mandate to defend Canadian territory and population, as well as its 
commitments to the US under NORAD, its support for both missile defence initiatives was 
expected. In 1985 and leading up to 2005, the Department had been set back by years of budget 
cuts. SDI and GMD presumably offered DND the possibility of increased equipment funding, 
not to mention the potential for an expanded role for NORAD. A successful missile defence 
program would act as a hedge against attacks by either the Soviet Union or rogue states and 
terrorist organizations. Finally, in both cases, there was anxiety about how non-participation 
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would affect Canada-US defence relations. But, as the analysis above has shown, even within 
DND there were misgivings about the both missiles programs. With SDI, both DND and DFAIT 
had concerns about the “‘destabilizing’ nature of high altitude Anti-Satellite systems” –– which 
were part of the SDI concept.
254
 And DND officials had the same fears as many Canadians that 
GMD posed a “significant risk” to international efforts to ban weapons in space.255  
 For the DEA (and its successor, DFAIT) it was a slightly different story. DEA and 
DFAIT were responsible for Canada’s international reputation and interests, which were firmly 
established in the field of arms control. Participation in SDI and GMD threatened Canada’s 
reputation and credibility as an active arms control advocate and there is little doubt of the 
discomfort felt by officials in these Departments with the possibility of weapons in space and 
another costly arms race, both of which ostensibly carried undesirable ramifications for the 
geostrategic balance.  
 As with DND, DEA (and DFAIT) placed great importance on maintaining good relations 
with the US; it was always in the background, and sometimes in the foreground, of discussions 
on missile defence. But with both SDI and GMD there was an unmistakable recognition of the 
commitments that Canada had made to arms control and to vehicles and policies that achieved 
strategic stability.   
 
4.2.4 The Prime Ministers 
 Missile defence presented Prime Ministers Brian Mulroney and Paul Martin with an 
opportunity to improve Canadian relations with the US and to ensure NORAD remained relevant 
to Canada. Yet both prime ministers recount the unease that they felt with the implications of the 
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respective missile defence programs. Mulroney took issue with SDI based on concerns about 
arms control efforts and its implications for strategic stability, while Martin vowed not to 
participate in GMD if it weaponized space.  
 There is little doubt that Mulroney’s concerns about strategic stability influenced his 
decision. He was, according to Peter Newman, alarmed by the idea of SDI technology in space 
and by the possibility of another costly round in the arms race.
256
 Because of these concerns, his 
government was pleased to hear initially from Washington that SDI would be bound by the 
ABM treaty. Further evidence of Mulroney’s concern is provided by a letter that he wrote to 
Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet General Secretary, in September 1985: 
Canada’s geographic location naturally requires us to take a particular interest in strategic 
issues and their associated arms control dimensions.... My government attaches great 
importance to maintaining the integrity of the ABM Treaty, one of the key elements in the 
strategic balance. Strict adherence by both parties to its provisions is one of fundamental 
importance to the arms control process.
257
  
 
 Mulroney declined to justify his position publicly on SDI in strategic terms. This is likely 
because he wanted to use language that would help improve the atmosphere of Canada-US 
relations, which had deteriorated under the Trudeau government. Saying no to Washington 
undiplomatically would have likely caused more damage to the Canada-US relationship.  
  Mulroney was keen to avoid the public outcry in Canada that might accompany a 
decision to participate in an exceedingly unpopular program. Although leading the largest 
majority government in Canadian history, his party’s support rested on a fragile coalition of 
supporters from Western Canada and Quebec. And Quebeckers had come out strongly in 
opposition to Canadian involvement in SDI. In the end, the “polite no” was partly a matter of 
minimizing differences in Canadian and US policy, and partly a recognition of the misgivings of 
Canadians (especially in Quebec) about arms control and strategic stability. 
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 By the time Martin had come to power in 2004, the international system had been 
transformed by the 9/11 attacks—for him, the strategic implications of a missile defence were no 
longer related to the cold war. His Foreign Minister, Peter Pettigrew stated: “we face a security 
environment dramatically different than during the cold war. While prospects of nuclear war and 
tensions between superpowers have diminished, prospects of asymmetrical threats have risen.”258 
Unlike Mulroney, who told Gorbachev that, in Canada’s view, missile defence systems would 
affect the strategic balance, Martin initially told Russian President Vladimir Putin that in the case 
of GMD this was not Canada’s greatest concern.259 
 In this sense, Martin and his senior colleagues appraised missile defence differently from 
Mulroney and his ministers. Of course, the respective decisions were made in two entirely 
different international and domestic political environments. In 1985, the bi-polar, nuclear-armed 
standoff characterizing the Cold War could not be ignored. In 2005, Canada’s borders and 
neighbours remained, but the importance of the country’s geography and international strategic 
stability had declined in the post-9/11 political atmosphere. Canada’s concerns, Martin indicated, 
were with different kinds of actors in the international system. But the public, and especially 
Quebeckers whose electoral support was critical for Martin, was now concerned about the 
change to the strategic environment where outer space might be weaponized, and the Prime 
Minister personally echoed this concern. 
 
4.3 Locating Internationalism in the Missile Defence Debate 
 The preceding analysis largely affirms Phillipe Legassé’s and Patrick Lennox’s 
propositions that Canada’s opposition to missile defence has been mainly about strategic 
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stability. But from where does such a concern about the international strategic environment 
arise? This thesis locates its roots in the Canadian political culture, or rather in ideas that 
Canadians have about the type of international system that they prefer. There is an abundance of 
evidence of significant opposition to SDI and GMD not only in statements by the Prime 
Ministers at the time but also in reports and/or comments by party leaders, senior bureaucrats, 
leading academics, activists, the press and the general public. Such statements can been seen as a 
reflection of a widely held view among Canadians that stability in the international system and 
initiatives such as those that promote arms control, are inherently desirable. Such a view, this 
thesis argues, is an expression of the Canadian brand of internationalism.  
 Some scholars argue that internationalism was a dominant idea in Canadian foreign 
policy in the decades immediately after the Second World War, but that by the 1970s it had lost 
its salience. Keating, Munton, and Nossal dispute this, and have argued that Canadian 
internationalism was still prevalent at the time of the SDI and GMD initiatives. The argument 
made here is that Canadian opposition to these two initiatives reflected the continued support by 
Canadians of internationalism, and in particular their search for one of internationalism’s main 
goals –– world order. The thesis maintains that, regardless of whether we are speaking of a 
bipolar nuclear and economic standoff or unipolar domination in an age of asymmetric threats, 
Canadian doubts about US-led missile defence initiatives were prompted by a belief that the 
premises behind such initiatives ran counter to Canada’s traditional support of international 
treaties and of multilateralism.  
 An ABM system’s effect on order in either era was fiercely debated among politicians. 
Even experts were highly divided on whether SDI or GMD would greatly alter the strategic 
calculus. Arguably, as a research program, the former never actually threatened nuclear 
deterrence, and the latter was created in an era void of deterrence or a nuclear balance. Whether 
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or not the general public or policy experts and leaders appraised each program’s effect on the 
existing orders correctly is not the focus. Rightly or wrongly, the view that American dominance 
of the strategic nuclear game threatened what tenuous order existed sheds light on how such 
programs were an affront to this basic ideal of Canadian internationalism. 
 
4.3.1 The Treaties 
 A great deal of Canadians’ criticism aimed at SDI and GMD was based upon their 
support for the 1972 ABM and 1967 Outer Space Treaties. Considered a crucial tool for 
preserving Cold War deterrence, the ABM Treaty always had strong Canadian support. 
Canadians were evidently uncomfortable with the idea that the US could undo nuclear deterrence 
and MAD by developing anti-ballistic missile technology. The threat to the Outer Space Treaty 
was also prevalent among Canadians’ appraisal of US missile technology. They viewed this 
Treaty as a critical component of international order, a key hedge against a costly arms race in 
the final frontier. 
 In 1985, public dialogue in Canada about missile defence included continuing references 
to the ABM Treaty. Numerous individuals and organizations that composed the peace movement 
expressed concerns about the possible demise of the Treaty. But such concerns extended beyond 
the peace movement to government leaders, experts, public servants and parliamentarians. When 
SDI was first discussed, the Mulroney government was relieved to hear that this initiative would 
not threaten the ABM Treaty.
260
  
 Much of the concern about SDI related to the scope and intent of its weaponry. For while 
SDI was ostensibly a research initiative, it had the potential to lead the US towards actual 
deployment of the technology in outer space. Such an occurrence would not only violate the 
                                                     
260
 Lennox, 77. 
69 
 
Outer Space Treaty but could cause a nuclear arms race in outer space, leading to a destabilized 
US-Soviet relationship and perhaps even war.  
 After the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, the concerns of Canadians about a 
possible arms race in space grew. Such concerns were further intensified when the Bush 
Administration came forward with the concept of GMD. While Russia and China responded to 
the GMD initiative by announcing their own new missile programs, Canadian officials worried 
about the position in which Canada would be placed. As Lennox clarifies: 
[s]upport for missile defence would align Canada with what was widely seen after the 2002 
US abrogation of the 1972 ABM Treaty as a destabilizing US foreign policy. As a result, 
such support could harm Canada’s specialized reputation in the broader international 
community. The prospect of an invincible America, combined with the corrosive effect the 
pursuit of this lofty goal had on the legal fabric of international society, put missile defence 
at odds with Canada’s interests in a multilateral managed, arms-controlled, anti-nuclear 
international system.
261
 
 
 Similar concerns were expressed by a variety of Canadians in the months that followed. 
Polls showed that both the public and the Canadian Prime Minister believed that GMD would 
weaponize space and lead to a new arms race. Martin declared publicly that Canada would not 
join a program that placed weapons in space. 
 
4.3.2 Multilateralism 
 It is also arguable that Canada’s rejection of SDI and GMD reflected the preference of 
Canadians to work for the stabilization of the international environment by multilateral as 
opposed to unilateral means. Canada’s goals were arms control and strategic stability, both being 
intrinsic goals in the multilateral search for world order. For example, Canadian policy-makers 
viewed SDI as a threat to superpower negotiations in Stockholm and Geneva, which most NATO 
members, including Canada, supported. In short, Canada’s concerns about SDI were clearly 
premised upon the Canadian desire for multilateral solutions in a delicate strategic environment.  
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 Just as important for Canadians was the fact that other countries, besides Canada, viewed 
SDI and GMD as dangerously unilateral and destabilizing. They linked SDI and GMD to 
Reagan’s and Bush’s broader foreign policies, which they found alarming. The Reagan 
administration’s “evil empire” rhetoric was distressing for many, especially after a decade of 
détente. According to Clarkson and Lorimer, under Reagan, the Pentagon took American 
unilateralism to new heights with minimal consultation with allies; the goal was to build US 
military superiority and challenge the USSR in any potential theatre of war.
262
 David Watt 
contends that both Canadians and their European counterparts believed the Reagan 
administration “vastly overreacted to the Soviet threat, thereby distorting the American (and 
hence the world) economy, quickening the arms race, warping its own judgment about events in 
the Third World, and further debasing the language of international intercourse with feverish 
rhetoric.”263 SDI, a centrepiece of Reagan’s foreign policy, was an unmistakable expression of 
US unilateralism, which Canadians opposed.  
 President George W. Bush’s foreign policy was even more unpopular in Canada than 
Reagan’s. Bush proved to be so unpopular that one could speak of an intense “anti-Bushism,”264 
which was different than traditional anti-Americanism. GMD appeared to be synonymous with 
the much–hated Bush Doctrine, which many Canadians perceived to be aggressively militaristic 
and destabilizing. They also associated it with Bush’s unilateralism, another example of which 
was his decision to abrogate the ABM treaty without meaningful consultation with other NATO 
members. National polls and statements by Canadian officials indicate that Canadians deemed 
the ABM Treaty abrogation to be irresponsible. They were unconvinced by the Bush 
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Administration’s claim that deterrence and nuclear stability were relics of the Cold War and held 
on to the logic of deterrence among the five original nuclear powers along with other nuclear-
armed states.
265
 While the US openly sought strategic superiority, Canadians believed their 
interests and values were better served by a more predictable world in which Canada continued 
to provide support for multilateral arms control agreements and opposed those initiatives that 
created distrust and instability.  
 Canada’s historic role in arms control, characterized by several decades of leadership in 
multilateral arms control regimes, must be considered as well. On one hand, the public 
continuously desired the peace and cooperation they associated with multilateralism and 
welcomed headlines which spoke of Canadian involvement. On the other hand, government 
officials and policy experts understood Canada’s reputation for leadership and support for 
multilateral arms control agreements.
266
  
 
4.3.3 Missile Defence and Peace    
 In support of the argument that Canada’s devotion to arms control and strategic stability 
was rooted in internationalism, it is important to note that this commitment was also consistent 
with internationalism’s other main tenet: peace. Clearly many Canadians were strongly opposed 
to SDI and GMD because their effects on arms control and world stability threatened world 
peace. Both SDI and GMD were connected to what Canadians perceived to be militaristic 
agendas and, as a result, were often viewed as offensive projects in spite of their defensive aim. 
From the perspective of Canadians who were unfamiliar with theories related to nuclear 
deterrence, international trends, and geopolitics, these initiatives represented quite simply a 
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threat to peace. As James G. Fergusson writes: “...the Canadian public, like all Western publics, 
is intuitively predisposed to oppose policies that speak of killing and war.”267 Such statements 
elucidate the connection between peace and order, as well as internationalism`s connection to 
missile defence.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
The roots of Canadian antipathy towards SDI and GMD are difficult to pinpoint. Yet, as 
this thesis has demonstrated, Canadians’ support for arms control and strategic stability was an 
important factor behind the rejection of both initiatives. The evidence shows that that such a 
stance arose out of a Canadian preoccupation with the pursuit of world order. To this end, 
Canadians were upholding ideals integral to internationalism, which called for the upholding of 
international treaties and the preference for multilateralism. A number of conclusions may be 
drawn from this study.  
Among the most obvious conclusions of this thesis is that ideas matter in the formulation 
of foreign policy. This is far from a new or innovative finding, as much study has already been 
devoted to the influence of ideas on policy. What is worth noting is the nature of these ideas and 
how they are articulated in the face of divisive issues. The emphasis each program’s opponents 
placed on arms races and the weaponization of space was indicative of the need for simplicity in 
communicating with the public. As arms control treaties and strategic stability carry a certain 
complexity often lost upon the average voter, these more easily identifiable concepts were used 
to galvanize opposition. What this might suggest is that although internationalism is strong in 
Canada, Canadians struggle to define it. But perhaps the struggle to articulate internationalism 
has as much to do with its complexity as it does with the latency of dominant ideas.  
 This thesis also lends credence to Denis Stairs’s notion of a parameter-setting effect. It 
could be fairly argued that the strong opposition resting on internationalism and the pursuit of 
order acted as parameters for both prime ministers. Although these parameters were not so 
defined that neither Mulroney nor Martin could move beyond them had they chosen 
participation, such a decision would have had a significant impact on their political capital. From 
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this angle, participation would have been political infeasible. Nevertheless, the scope and 
influence of this effect on government activity is extraordinarily difficult to gauge, so it is 
probably better to avoid unscholarly speculation until the parameters of public opinion can be 
more thoroughly explored. At the very least, parameter-setting is a logical and interesting 
concept that students of Canadian foreign policy and international relations should continue to 
consider in their analysis of foreign policy dilemmas, especially in instances of intense public 
pressure. 
 Finally, Canada’s decision to reject SDI and GMD casts doubts on repeated declarations 
by academics that Canadian internationalism has been in decline since the end of the Cold War. 
Public discourse in Canada on foreign policy issues, along with polling and in-depth academic 
studies, demonstrate the resilience of internationalism; two decades seem to have done little to 
mitigate the potency of this dominant idea. Although recent government policies have arguably 
been painted more in Continentalist, Regionalist, or perhaps even Realist hues, internationalism 
shows no sign of disappearing at the public level. Indeed, internationalism remains a centre-piece 
of the national political culture. 
Its survival as a component of Canadian political culture raises a few questions for 
students and scholars of Canadian foreign policy to explore: Will internationalism thrive amidst 
domestic and global changes in the twenty-first century, and with a government in Ottawa 
apparently committed to a foreign policy that shuns international diplomacy in favour of the 
pursuit of economic and security interests? Will internationalism come to be used mostly as a 
tool of rhetoric while other dominant ideas increasingly determine the substance of Canada’s 
foreign policy? More specifically, how will Canada pursue arms control in a world that is likely 
to see more exotic weaponry in the arsenals of major great powers and how will it reconcile its 
commitments to either NORAD or NATO amidst these pursuits? Finally, what sort of dilemmas 
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might missile defence bring for Canada in the near future? The questions surrounding 
internationalism and a future missile defence dilemma are worthy of contemplation. 
Since Stephen Harper’s Conservatives formed government in 2006, there has a been a 
clear attempt to steer Canada’s foreign policy away from internationalist ideas. A determination 
to distinguish Harper’s ideologically-based approach from ideas often associated with the Liberal 
Party is the most likely source of this shift. The Harper approach envisages a Canada less willing 
to “go along to get along”, a focus on sectoral national interests, and a slightly more militaristic 
or aggressive tone. Given that internationalism has had decades to entrench itself in the national 
psyche, it is unclear if the Harper government will be able to reshape Canada’s foreign policy 
along such lines. Future research should seek to determine if this ideational shift has a lasting 
impact on Canadians’ views of international relations and foreign policy. The possible 
emergence of another dominant idea should be considered. 
NATO’s ongoing effort to build a European missile defence system will undoubtedly be 
the subject of another case study in the near future. The alliance’s consensus-based approach to 
decision-making suggests that Canada has not opposed this endeavour. On the other hand, the 
notion that Canada influenced the language and scope of the program cannot be ruled out.  When 
more details are available, scholars should explore the sources of Canada’s decision to either 
support or not prevent this development.  
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